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SAFEGUARDING THE SAFEGUARDS: THE ACA LITIGATION
AND THE EXTENSION OF INDIRECT PROTECTION TO
NONFUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES
Abigail R. Moncrieff
Abstract
As the lawsuits challenging the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA) have evolved, one feature of the litigation has proven especially
rankling to the legal academy: the courts‘ incorporation of substantive
libertarian concerns into their structural federalism analyses. The breadth
and depth of scholarly criticism is surprising, especially given that judges
frequently choose indirect methods, including the structural and processbased methods at issue in the ACA litigation, for protecting substantive
constitutional values. Indeed, indirect protection of constitutional liberties
is a well-known and well-theorized strategy, which one scholar recently
termed ―semisubstantive review‖ and another theorized as ―judicial
manipulation of legislative enactment costs.‖
This Article situates the Commerce Clause and taxing power
arguments that form the basis of the ACA litigation within the broader
contexts of semisubstantive review and enactment cost manipulation,
arguing that the application of these structural theories is an ordinary and
effectual means of raising the political cost of libertarian infringements.
The Article then considers three possible distinctions between the ACA
case and the ordinary case of semisubstantive review and concludes that
the only viable descriptive distinction is that the ACA case involves
nonfundamental rather than fundamental liberty interests—the freedom of
health and the freedom of contract. The Article argues that this distinction
should not make a normative difference. If anything, the case for structural
invalidation should be stronger when nonfundamental liberty interests are
at stake because those are, by definition, the interests that the American
legal system leaves to structural protection. If the Supreme Court
invalidates the ACA on structural grounds, it can argue that it is merely
safeguarding the safeguards of liberty.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent populist objections to the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA)1 undoubtedly center on concerns for individual liberty,
not concerns about governmental divisions of labor.2 As many legal
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
2. See Kevin Sack, Tea Party Shadows Health Care Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, at
A16, available at www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/health/policy/02notebook.html (quoting the
Florida Attorney General as saying, ―It‘s about our liberty. It‘s about more than health care‖); David
G. Savage & Kathleen Hennessey, Ruling Against Health Insurance Mandate Is a „Tea Party‟
Milestone, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/10/nation/la-na-tea-

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1919272

2012]

ACA LITIGATION AND THE EXTENSION OF INDIRECT PROTECTION

641

scholars have noted, the Tea Party‘s objections to the ACA arise from the
perceived antilibertarian substance of the law, not the federalist structure
of the law. 3 Tea Party leaders have objected most strongly to the statute‘s
intrusions on healthcare autonomy and economic liberty, not to its
intrusions on states‘ rights. Nevertheless, the litigation that has flowed
from the populist movement is focused entirely on structural rather than
substantive constitutional doctrines.4 The litigants have challenged the
individual mandate only on the ground that it exceeds Congress‘s Article I
powers,5 rather than on the ground that it violates substantive due process
norms, such as the freedom of health6 or the freedom of contract.7 There is
therefore a tension between the concerns that motivate the ACA litigation
and the doctrines that are central to it, and that tension is provoking strong
reactions among legal academics.8
Of course, the seeming inconsistency is, to a large extent, simply a
wise litigation strategy. Assertions of a broad freedom of health have
consistently failed, even in the comparatively sympathetic U.S. Court of
party-healthcare-20110211 (noting that Judge Roger Vinson‘s ruling against the ACA centered on
limiting intrusions of the federal government into people‘s lives).
3. See The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Charles Fried, Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School) (―[T]he objection [to the individual mandate], while serious, is not at all about the scope of
Congress‘s power under the Commerce Clause. It is about an imposition on our personal liberty, a
liberty guaranteed by the 5th and 14th Amendments, and guaranteed against invasion not only
against federal but also against state power.‖); Mark A. Hall, Individual Versus State Constitutional
Rights Under Health Care Reform, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1233, 1235 (2011) (noting the tension between
the individual rights rhetoric underlying the ACA litigation and the states‘ rights doctrines actually
argued); Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health
Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 22 (2011) (noting that concerns for individual liberty are
driving the litigation); Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1723, 1742 (2011) (characterizing the ―basic objection to the individual mandate‖ as
―libertarian‖). Others have noted the critiques against Judge Vinson‘s ruling. See Aziz Huq, In
Healthcare Ruling, Libertarianism by Judicial Diktat, THE NATION (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://www.thenation.com/article/158427/healthcare-ruling-libertarianism-judicial-diktat.
4. See Appellants‘ Brief at 29–30, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir.
2011) (No. 10-2388) [hereinafter TMLC Brief]; Plaintiffs‘ Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss at 23, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human
Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT) [hereinafter Bondi
Memo]; Plaintiff‘s Memorandum in Opposition to the Secretary‘s Motion for Summary Judgment
at 11–12, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No.
3:10cv188) [hereinafter Cuccinelli Memo].
5. TMLC Brief, supra note 4, at 20; Bondi Memo, supra note 4, at 23–24, 36; Cuccinelli
Memo, supra note 4, at 28.
6. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2210 (2011);
cf. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep‘t Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1161–62
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting a handful of plaintiffs‘ substantive due process arguments, including a
freedom of health argument).
7. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905).
8. See supra note 3.
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit;9 Lochner-style freedom of contract has been
a dead letter for generations;10 and the current members of the U.S.
Supreme Court, who will be the final arbiters in the litigation,11 are
generally hostile to assertions of implied fundamental rights but
sympathetic to structural federalism.12 The ACA plaintiffs‘ decision to
argue structural rather than substantive doctrines, thus, is probably nothing
more than a strategic decision to focus on the arguments that are most
likely to succeed.
Five federal judges‘ acceptance of those structural arguments, however,
starts to look more interesting (or, some would say, more nefarious). The
plaintiffs‘ structural arguments have convinced primarily those judges and
academics who share the Tea Party‘s substantive inclinations, and the
judges who have deemed the mandate structurally invalid have applied a
kind of hybrid substantive–structural analysis to reach their conclusions.13
They have argued that the mandate is not a permissible regulation of
interstate commerce because it seems substantively problematic for the
government to force people to buy things. That is, although Article I,
9. See Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 864–66 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a freedom of
health challenge to federal restrictions on medicinal marijuana); see also Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(holding that plaintiffs do not have a fundamental liberty interest in accessing experimental drugs).
10. See generally David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373
(2003) (explaining the failures of the Lochner-era decisions concerning freedom of contract).
11. There is now a circuit split on the constitutionality of the ACA‘s individual mandate. See
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir.
2011) (holding portions of the ACA unconstitutional); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347,
2011 WL 3962915, at *52 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (finding the ACA constitutional in its entirety).
At the time of writing, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit to resolve the split but had not yet decided the case. See Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-393); Dep‘t of Health & Human
Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-398); Florida v. Dep‘t of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400).
12. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (denying Congress‘s
constitutional authority for providing a federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violence); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
exceeds Congress‘s Commerce Clause authority); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992) (limiting Congress‘s authority to control ―radioactive waste disposal‖ among the states); see
also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court‟s Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (acknowledging the modern Court‘s commitment ―to
enforcing limits on national power and to protecting the integrity of the states‖); Richard W.
Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (2003) (same); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court‟s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 115–16 (2004) (arguing that a ―process-based approach to federalism jurisprudence may
have significant advantages over a more substantive model‖).
13. See, e.g., Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *9–10 (4th Cir.
Sept. 8, 2011); Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1314 (11th Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp.
1256, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
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Section 8 has provided the doctrinal basis for all of the litigation holdings
so far, the five invalidating judges have all incorporated libertarian
concerns into their analyses. Absent that libertarian inflection, though, the
judges‘ structural arguments would be extremely weak. The Commerce
Clause and taxing power objections to the individual mandate, thus, seem
not only to incorporate liberty-based concerns but, in fact, to hinge on
them.
This hybridization—the importation of libertarian norms into structural
analyses—is the feature of the ACA litigation that has proven most
rankling to the legal academy.14 One scholar, for example, has accused the
ACA plaintiffs and invalidating judges of ―[s]muggling a libertarian-based
limitation into constitutional law by concealing it in the garb of
federalism.‖15 Others have simply observed that, because the plaintiffs‘
structural arguments seem at odds with their true (substantive) concerns,
even success in the litigation will fail to accomplish their actual agenda.16
As these scholars have noted, the prevailing judicial analysis would leave
state governments free to encroach on the substantive liberties that Tea
Party leaders want to protect.17 Indeed, that analysis would also allow
Congress to reenact the ACA‘s mandate, albeit in slightly altered form.
There is therefore a solid consensus among legal scholars—with very few
detractors18—that structural invalidation of the ACA would be an
inappropriate and ineffective way to protect the substantive liberties at the
heart of populist objections.19
But the breadth and vehemence of this academic consensus is quite
surprising. The invalidating judges‘ strategy of hybridizing substance and
structure is not novel or even unusual; it is a strategy that has been
14. See sources cited supra note 3.
15. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1746.
16. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 3, at 1234–35; Koppelman, supra note 3, at 22.
17. See Koppelman, supra note 3, at 15–16, 23 (noting that Massachusetts has already
enacted health insurance legislation comparable to that of the federal government); Smith, supra
note 3, at 1742–44.
18. For critiques claiming that the individual mandate is outright unconstitutional, see Randy
E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 586 (2010) [hereinafter Commandeering the
People]; Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin‟s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 26–27) [hereinafter Interaction Theory]; Kenneth T. Cuccinelli,
II, E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. & Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Why the Debate over the Constitutionality of
the Federal Health Care Law Is About Much More than Health Care, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 293,
295 (2011). For other detractors‘ opinions, see Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for
Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 267, 268 (2011) (arguing that ―the Necessary and Proper Clause does not authorize the
individual mandate‖); David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Debate, A Healthy Debate: The
Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 93, 100 (2009)
(noting the unconstitutionality of the individual mandate).
19. See sources cited supra note 3.
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identified and defended in the legal literature for decades.20 Indeed, as a
significant and still-growing body of scholarship has recognized, the
Rehnquist Court systematized and thereby largely legitimized the use of
structural and other process-based doctrines to protect substantive
values21—an approach that Professor Dan Coenen, in an extensive survey
of Rehnquist Court doctrine, termed ―semisubstantive constitutional
review‖22 and that Professor Matthew Stephenson more recently theorized
and defended as ―judicial manipulation of legislative enactment costs.‖23
The puzzle, then, is why this common and well-theorized judicial strategy
of hybridization is arousing such strong scholarly objections when applied
in the ACA case.
The predominant answer seems to be that, in most scholars‘ view, the
individual mandate simply does not infringe upon liberty—at least not in
any constitutionally meaningful way—and therefore does not deserve
invalidation at all, whether through substantive or structural doctrines.24 It
20. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 206–07
(1976) (―[A] rule must make sense not only as a criterion for judicial review but as a theory for the
constitutional conduct of government antecedent to judicial review.‖); Henry P. Monaghan,
Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975); Laurence A. Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 269 (1975) (suggesting the hybrid of
substance and structure as ―a third category of constitutional limitation‖).
21. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2002) [hereinafter
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review] (discussing the use of semisubstantive doctrines in the
Rehnquist Court); Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental
Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1583
(2001) [hereinafter Constitution of Collaboration] (discussing Supreme Court doctrines that serve
as ‗―structural safeguards of substantive rights‘‖); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996
Term—Forward: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 105 (1997) (discussing the
drawbacks of various doctrines used in substantive constitutional analysis); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
Federalism as Westphalian Liberalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 769, 797 (2006) [hereinafter
Westphalian Liberalism] (arguing that federalism is a good way to deal with deep and intense
disagreements over individual liberty); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism
in the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 888, 903 (2006) [hereinafter Individual Right to
Federalism] (making the case for state elaboration of substantive rights, at least as a way of
evolving national consensus prior to federal judicial enforcement); John F. Manning, Clear
Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 419 (2010) (discussing the values
emphasized by the Rehnquist Court); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action:
Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE
L.J. 2, 6, 39 (2008) (noting the Court‘s protection of substantive values through the open
interpretation of ambiguous statutes); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1613 (2000) (discussing the
structural doctrines).
22. See generally Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra note 21.
23. Stephenson, supra note 21, at 2.
24. See Rick Hills, Comment to Healthcare and Federalism: Should Courts Strictly
Scrutinize Federal Regulation of Medical Services?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 14, 2011, 3:40 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/08/healthcare-and-federalism-should-courts-strictly-
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is worth considering, however, what the basis for that view is and whether
it should matter in the context of semisubstantive review. Although largely
implicit, the scholarly critique has taken three different dimensions. First,
some scholars have implied that there is no relevant liberty interest at stake
at all, dispensing with the substantive arguments simply by noting that the
Lochner era is dead.25 For these scholars, the motivating objection to the
ACA litigation seems to be a view that the freedom of health and the
freedom of contract have no continuing constitutional relevance.26 Second,
some scholars have urged that the identified liberty interests have not been
breached in this particular case, arguing that there is no individual right to
be uninsured.27 Their motivating objection is that the individual mandate
does not violate the freedom of health or the freedom of contract—and
would not even if those freedoms received robust substantive due process
protection.28 Finally, some scholars have implied that the liberty interests
at issue should not garner any judicial protection at all, whether direct or
indirect. The motivating objection here seems to be that neither the
freedom of health nor the freedom of contract is a ―fundamental liberty
interest‖ that receives strict scrutiny when enforced directly29 and that such
liberties should not be enforced indirectly at all.
Although each of these objections rests on plausible premises, only the
third presents a potentially viable distinction between ordinary
semisubstantive review and the ACA judges‘ hybrid decisions. As for the
first objection, although the freedom of health and freedom of contract are
rarely used to invalidate state action, there can be no doubt that both of
these substantive values have continuing constitutional relevance. As for
scrutinize-federal-regulation-of-medical-services-.html#comments (―[U]ntil I have some account of
why [the Act‘s] burden is different from run-of-the-mill social welfare legislation that Congress
routinely enacts . . . , I am not inclined to invoke constitutional limits on Congress‘ power to
preserve the liberty of waiting until one is sick before purchasing insurance.‖) [hereinafter
Healthcare and Federalism]; see also Smith, supra note 3, at 1745–46; Michael C. Dorf, The
Constitutionality of Health Insurance Reform, Part I: The Misguided Libertarian Objection,
FINDLAW.COM (Oct. 21, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/ 20091021.html.
25. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 1825, 1858–64 (2011) (rejecting Professor Randy Barnett‘s idea that the Tenth
Amendment‘s reservation of powers to the people could support an anticommandeering doctrine to
protect individual economic liberty); Koppelman, supra note 3, at 22–23 (citing Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (proposing that the freedom of health does not exist at all)).
26. See sources cited supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 3, at 1235 (―[T]here is no constitutional basis for an
individually-protected liberty interest to avoid buying health insurance.‖).
28. See Moncrieff, supra note 6, at 2247–51 (analyzing the individual mandate under a
generously robust version of the freedom of health and concluding that it ought to be upheld against
a substantive due process challenge).
29. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 3, at 1236 (―In the modern era, substantive due process is
invoked only to protect individual rights that are ‗fundamental‘ to ‗ordered liberty,‘ but the
proposition that people have a fundamentally protected right to be uninsured is almost laughable.‖
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–28 (1937))).
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the second, although it is almost certainly true that the individual mandate
would not violate the freedom of health or the freedom of contract if those
doctrines applied directly, the mandate presents a serious enough challenge
to the asserted liberties that it could provoke structural invalidation under
ordinary semisubstantive review.30
As for the third, however, there is a plausible descriptive distinction.
The scholarship on semisubstantive review has argued that the practice is
usually limited to the protection of fundamental constitutional values,31 and
the freedom of health and freedom of contract are not fundamental. To the
extent that these two liberty interests are subject to direct judicial
protection today, they receive something far less stringent than strict
scrutiny.
The question, then, is whether this descriptive distinction should make
a normative difference. Even if semisubstantive review has been limited to
fundamental values before, are the justifications for its application
contingent on whether the implicated liberty interest is fundamental? And
even if the existing justifications are contingent on the existence of a
fundamental interest, might there be other justifications that could support
the application of hybrid doctrines to protect nonfundamental liberties?
Overall, is the extension of structural protection to nonfundamental
liberties justifiable?
This Article argues that it is, for two reasons. First, the plausible
arguments for excluding nonfundamental liberties from indirect protection
would rest on a flawed assumption that liberty interests are statically
catalogued as either fundamental or not. But liberties regularly shift in or
out of ―fundamental‖ status as social norms change (as the death of the
Lochner era and the emergence of privacy-based rights amply
demonstrate).32 Indirect review can be a useful testing ground to determine
whether a particular liberty interest should move between the two
categories, allowing courts to gain information about the depth and breadth
of popular preferences. Second, even for those liberties that ought to
remain nonfundamental, the case for using structural doctrines to protect
those liberties should be stronger, not weaker, than the case for using
structural doctrines to protect fundamental liberties. Nonfundamental
30. See Manning, supra note 21, at 401 (noting that the Court uses hybrid rules to invalidate
statutes even though the norms of such rules ―derive from constitutional inspiration, and not
constitutional compulsion‖); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1960–61
(1997) (cataloguing cases in which ―avoided‖ interpretations of statutes were later held to be
constitutionally permissible on the merits).
31. See Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra note 21, at 1283, 1314–27
(highlighting the ways in which the Court has employed semisubstantive review in the contexts of
the First Amendment and federalism).
32. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009)
(explaining Lochner‘s use of freedom of contract as fundamental).
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liberties are, by definition, those that we have left to political protection
through structural safeguards.33 If there is ever a time that judges justifiably
could use structural rather than substantive doctrines to protect individual
liberty, it ought to be when the judges are simply safeguarding the
safeguards—bolstering or enforcing these structural constitutional norms
to ensure that infringements on liberty really are politically preferred.
Of course, this latter view demands that the structural holdings be
defensible as safeguarding rather than distorting political safeguards. This
point has formed a separate basis for scholarly criticism of the ACA
holdings. These critics have objected strongly to the ACA cases‘ new
rules—the action–inaction distinction for the commerce power34 and the
―t-word rule‖ for the taxing power35—on the ground that they are
constitutionally and structurally indefensible.36 As a critique of the
invalidating opinions in the ACA litigation so far, I agree. I will argue,
however, that a better-crafted and openly semisubstantive holding in the
ACA litigation could rest on sound structural principles, obviating this
critique.
It is important to note that my purpose here is neither to argue in favor
of invalidating the ACA nor to propose that it is unconstitutional; to the
contrary, I believe that the ACA represents good policy as well as good
federalism.37 Rather, my purpose is to illuminate a different understanding
of the ACA holdings—one with strong footing in the legal literature—in
33. Id.
34. Most of the Commerce Clause holdings rest on a distinction between economic activity,
which Congress may regulate, and economic inactivity, which Congress may not regulate. See infra
Part I.B.2.a.
35. In the litigation, several courts have insisted that the individual mandate imposes a
penalty rather than a tax because Congress refused to call it a tax during its deliberations. See infra
Part I.B.1.a. Professor Akhil Amar termed this decision the ―t-word rule‖ because it requires the
members to use the word ―tax‖ if they want to exercise their taxing power. See Akhil Amar, The
Lawfulness of Health-Care Reform 8–9 (Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 228,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856506.
36. See Jack M. Balkin, supra note 18, at 102–08; Hall, supra note 3, at 1235 (critiquing the
courts‘ Commerce Clause analysis); Smith, supra note 3, at 1745–46; Amar, supra note 35, at 8–9;
Rick Hills, Federalism & Healthcare: The Dangers & Benefits of Confusing Individual Rights with
Federalism, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 14, 2010, 10:07 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.
com/prawfsblawg/2010/12/federalism-healthcare-the-dangers-benefits-of-confusing-individualrights-with-federalism.html (describing Judge Henry Hudson‘s hybrid analysis as ―structurally
otiose‖).
37. See generally Abigail R. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: Reconciling Collective
Action Federalism and Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation and Beyond, 37 AM.
J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that the ACA strikes a rational federalist balance that
deserves the Supreme Court‘s deference); Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for
Centralization in Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL‘Y 266, 269 (2011) (arguing that the ACA‘s greatest federalism failures lie in its
maintenance of state authority over some things, not in its centralization of authority over many
things).
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the hope of shifting the debate to firmer ground. In my view, the
substantive libertarian arguments in the ACA discourse deserve more
serious consideration than the legal academy has given them so far; they
are relevant and important, even in the context of the Tea Party plaintiffs‘
structural attack. Furthermore, there might be very good reasons for
denying semisubstantive invalidation of the ACA—including general
critiques of semisubstantive review as well as critiques of the plaintiffs‘
specific semisubstantive arguments. In a literature that fails to recognize
the cases as ordinary semisubstantive cases, though, those arguments will
never appear. This Article therefore seeks to spark debate on those
untouched questions.
Part I summarizes the literature on semisubstantive review and
enactment cost manipulation and situates the ACA holdings‘ hybrid
substantive–structural analysis within the broader context of indirect
review. Part II considers the three possible distinctions between the ACA
case and ordinary semisubstantive review and concludes that the only
viable distinction is the doctrinal status of the asserted liberty interests as
nonfundamental. Part III argues that this distinction should not make a
normative difference on the enactment cost theory of semisubstantive
review or, if anything, that it should lend greater rather than lesser
justification to the strategy of semisubstantive review. Part IV addresses
objections to the ACA courts‘ structural analyses and asserts that a more
skillfully crafted judicial opinion could rest on defensible and generalizable
structural principles. The Article concludes that the invalidating judges
have pursued a recognizable strategy in the ACA litigation, attempting to
raise the individual mandate‘s political enactment cost without prohibiting
legislative infringements of the freedom of health or freedom of contract.
Their opinions might not reach the right result, but their blending of
substance and structure is neither unusual nor unwarranted.
I. SEMISUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND THE ACA CASES
So far, five federal judges have opined that the ACA‘s individual
mandate ought to be invalidated.38 All five have argued that Congress lacks
power to penalize individuals for failure to carry health insurance for two
reasons: first, they argue that Congress must regulate activity—rather than
inactivity—when it exercises its Commerce Clause power, and second,
they argue that Congress must openly identify exactions as taxes in order to
38. Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1310–
11 (11th Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 569 (6th Cir. 2011) (Graham,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―In no other instance has Congress before attempted to
force a non-participant into a market.‖); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human
Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (―It would be a radical departure from existing
case law to hold that Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.‖); Virginia ex
rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va. 2010).
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exercise its taxing power.39 Notably, the relevant opinions hinge largely, if
not entirely, on substantive libertarian norms rather than structural
federalism norms.40 Yet the holdings center on structural doctrines that
would leave states free to breach the relevant liberties and would, in fact,
leave Congress free to reenact the mandate in only slightly altered form.41
The scholarly reaction to these opinions has been almost uniformly
critical. In addition to questioning the relevance, usefulness, and
administrability of the action–inaction distinction and questioning the logic
behind the ―t-word rule‖42 for the taxing power, several scholars have also
criticized, more generally, the incorporation of libertarian norms into
structural doctrines. That latter critique, however, is puzzling given the
pervasiveness of judicial indirection in the protection of constitutional
liberties. This Part will summarize the literature that describes and defends
indirect protection of substantive constitutional norms through structural
and process-based doctrines, a complex judicial habit that the Article
encompasses under the borrowed term ―semisubstantive review‖43 and
discusses in the borrowed terms of ―judicial manipulation of legislative
enactment costs.‖44 This Part will then demonstrate that both the tax and
39. See supra note 38.
40. See Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788 (―At its core, this dispute is not simply about
regulating the business of insurance—or crafting a scheme of universal health insurance coverage—
it‘s about an individual‘s right to choose to participate.‖); see also TMLC, 651 F.3d at 572:
In the absence of the mandate, individuals have the right to decide how to finance
medical expenses. The mandate extinguishes that right. Congress may of course
provide incentives . . . to steer behavior, and it may impose certain requirements or
prohibitions once an individual decides to engage in a commercial activity. . . . It
is a different matter entirely to force an individual to engage in commercial
activity that he would not otherwise undertake of his own volition.
Another ACA case insisted there was a distinction between regulations that leave individuals with
multiple compliance opportunities and mandates that require unique action, Florida ex rel. Atty.
Gen, 648 F.3d at 1291–92:
Although this distinction appears, at first blush, to implicate liberty concerns not
at issue on appeal, in truth it strikes at the heart of whether Congress has acted
within its enumerated power. Individuals subjected to this economic mandate have
not made a voluntary choice to enter the stream of commerce, but instead are
having that choice imposed upon them by the federal government. This suggests
that they are removed from the traditional subjects of Congress‘s commerce
authority . . . .
Id.; see also Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1286 (reasoning, in a now infamous allusion
to the tax on tea that spurred the American Revolution, that the founders would not have ―create[d]
a government with the power to force people to buy tea in the first place‖).
41. See infra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 36.
43. Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra note 21, at 1282.
44. Stephenson, supra note 21, at 2.
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commerce analyses in the ACA opinions can be understood as instances of
this common judicial strategy, raising the enactment cost for a regulatory
project that implicates substantive constitutional values.45
A. Semisubstantive Review and Enactment Cost Manipulation
Despite the fact that the term ―semisubstantive review‖ is not
widespread in the literature, the phenomenon of semisubstantive review is
quite well-known and well-theorized. Indeed, three foundational papers
were published in 1975 and 1976 discussing various kinds of
semisubstantive review: former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde
termed the phenomenon ―due process of lawmaking‖; Professor Laurence
Tribe termed it ―structural due process‖; and Professor Henry Monaghan
termed it the ―constitutional common law.‖46 The scholarship has grown
significantly from there.47
What is semisubstantive review? As used here,48 it encompasses the
structural and process-based doctrines that judges use to make substantive
constitutional infringements more difficult without making them
impossible. Professor Matthew Stephenson provided an excellent synthesis
of and justification for this general judicial habit in his recent article, The
Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs.49 Stephenson demonstrated
that, as a descriptive matter, many judicially created constitutional rules
serve to raise the enactment cost of regulations that intrude on substantive
constitutional values, rather than putting judges in the position of weighing
the substantive benefits of regulation against the substantive costs of
liberty. For example, under current doctrine, Congress is allowed to pass a
bill that restricts speech, but only under certain conditions: it must include
explicit speech-restricting language in the statute (a ―clear statement
rule‖),50 tailor the regulatory approach narrowly to solve a particular and
compelling problem (the ―narrow tailoring requirement‖),51 explain its
interest in the regulation during legislative debates, and use non-troubling
rhetoric to sell the regulation to voters (two ―legislative history‖ rules).52 If
Congress fails to satisfy these requirements, the courts will refuse to apply
the statute in a way that restricts speech, often simply by reading it
45. See id. at 6–7.
46. Linde, supra note 20, at 199; Tribe, supra note 20, at 269; Monaghan, supra note 20, at
3.
47. For a detailed review of this scholarship, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
48. Although Coenen never gave the term a precise definition, I am using it in a manner that
resembles his usage. See Coenen, supra note 21, at 1282–83.
49. Stephenson, supra note 21, at 4.
50. Id. at 36–42.
51. Id. at 34–36.
52. Id. at 42–55 (discussing judicial rules that reward ―good‖ legislative history and that
penalize ―bad‖ legislative history).
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narrowly.
These requirements, then, are substantive in the sense that they apply
only when substantive values are at stake, but they are only
semisubstantive because they leave room for Congress to reenact the same
substantive regulatory rule by following different drafting or debating
procedures. Furthermore, they are different from direct review under
substantive due process insofar as they leave the weighing of costs and
benefits to politics rather than requiring judges to decide whether
Congress‘s regulation is important enough to withstand constitutional
scrutiny—to justify the infringement on liberty.
Many scholars have criticized these forms of constitutional doctrine—
particularly clear statement rules—on the ground that they over-enforce
substantive constitutional norms.53 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit Judge Richard Posner, for example, famously denounced the
modern canon of constitutional avoidance for creating a ―judge-made
constitutional ‗penumbra‘‖ around substantive constitutional limits, which
allows judges to refuse statutory applications that would be constitutionally
permissible on direct review.54 And it is certainly true, as an empirical
matter, that courts sometimes narrow or invalidate statutes in order to
avoid constitutionally problematic applications that would be upheld under
direct review. Indeed, courts have sometimes refused to apply statutes in
ways that were later deemed constitutionally acceptable.55
Coenen, Stephenson, and a handful of others, however, have argued
that critics like Posner simply misunderstand the nature of the substantive
constitutional limits themselves.56 All such limits, even when enforced
directly, are subject to override in the face of sufficiently compelling
government interests. Even under strict scrutiny, courts will allow
restrictive legislation to stand if it ―furthers a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.‖57 But judges are often bad at
53. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 619–29 (1992); Manning,
supra note 21, at 418–19; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983); Vermeule, supra note 30, at 1977.
54. Posner, supra note 53, at 816.
55. See Vermeule, supra note 30, at 1949 (describing the phenomenon of ―modern
avoidance‖).
56. These scholars have responded to a broad range of different critiques on constitutional
doctrine. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive”
Constitutional Rules, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2835 (2008) (discussing semisubstantive decision
making); see also Fallon, supra note 21, at 57 (discussing modern avoidance); Linde, supra note
20, at 206 (discussing modern avoidance); Stephenson, supra note 21, at 62 (discussing creation of
barriers for constitutionally problematic congressional policies); Tribe, supra note 20, at 269
(discussing structural due process); Young, supra note 21, at 1550–51 (discussing modern
avoidance).
57. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (quoting Fed.
Election Comm‘n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)) (internal quotation marks
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figuring out whether an asserted government interest, particularly a
government interest asserted only in post hoc litigation, is sufficiently
important to justify an infringement on individual liberty. The value of
semisubstantive rules, as Stephenson argues, is that they force the political
process to demonstrate, rather than merely assert, that the government‘s
interest in a particular encroachment is strong enough.58 By raising the cost
of enactment, judges create a barrier—perhaps a constitutionally required
barrier—for infringing legislation, but it is a barrier that the political
process can overcome by itself, without requiring further judicial inquiry
into the merits of an asserted regulatory interest.59
In short, semisubstantive rules are those that raise the cost of enacting
legislation that implicates substantive constitutional norms. As previously
noted, the most commonly discussed semisubstantive rules are drafting
rules, which require Congress to speak clearly and narrowly if it wants to
pass infringing statutes.60 Another class of semisubstantive rules, though,
simply allocates decisionmaking authority to costlier institutions—such as
rules that prohibit administrative agencies from treading on constitutionally
problematic ground even when Congress would be allowed to do so.61
Because agencies can enact legislative rules more cheaply than Congress,
judges force Congress rather than agencies to craft the rules that implicate
substantive constitutional values. By requiring bicameralism and
presentment, courts can be assured that liberty-restricting rules are
politically important enough to be allowed.
The justification for all of these semisubstantive rules, then, is that they
provide the courts with useful information about the true strength of the
government‘s interest in a substantive constitutional infringement. If the
political process can overcome a judicially manipulated higher cost of
enactment, then the courts can be assured that the government‘s interest in
the infringing legislation is strong enough to justify the infringement. If the
political process cannot overcome that higher cost of enactment, then the
courts should assume that the government‘s interest in infringement is too
weak to justify the intrusion. In the ACA case, the question is whether the
government‘s interests in combating adverse selection and cost-shifting in
healthcare are strong enough to justify the individual mandate‘s libertarian
infringement.

omitted).
58. Stephenson, supra note 20, at 4.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
61. See Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra note 21, at 1370–81
(describing such doctrines as ―constitutional ‗who‘ rules‖).
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B. The ACA Cases as Semisubstantive Cases
1. Taxing
In the first phases of the ACA litigation, the government argued that
the individual mandate is constitutional as an exercise of Congress‘s taxing
power. The plaintiffs, however, maintained that the mandate is not a tax at
all,62 and almost every court that has decided the case so far has agreed
(with the exception of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit).63
Nevertheless, the courts‘ analyses of the taxing power have taken a
decidedly semisubstantive form, and it is therefore worth reviewing the
arguments.
a. The ACA Judges‘ Analyses
Under current doctrine, Congress‘s taxing power is extremely broad.
Congress may tax for revenue-raising or regulatory purposes,64 and it may
use taxation to accomplish results that it may not accomplish through
direct regulation.65 Under the Sixteenth Amendment,66 Congress may tax
any derived income, and it may use whatever rules it chooses for
62. They have argued in the alternative that the mandate is an unapportioned direct tax that
violates Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (―Representatives and direct
Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers . . . .‖). See generally Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung,
Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, 128 TAX NOTES 169, 170, 194–95 (2010) (arguing
that the mandate is unconstitutional even if it is a tax because it is an unapportioned direct tax). All
of the courts to have addressed the question so far, however, have found either that the mandate is
not a tax or that it is a tax that falls under the Anti-Injunction Act‘s jurisdictional bar, and they have
therefore failed to reach this alternative argument.
63. Compare Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10–2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *5–6 (4th Cir.
Sept. 8, 2011) (concluding that the mandate does constitute a tax), with Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that ―every . . . court that
has addressed this claim‖ has been unpersuaded).
64. See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (―It is beyond serious question that
a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters
the activities taxed. . . . The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously
negligible . . . or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary . . . .‖); see also Bob Jones Univ.
v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974) (noting favorably the Court‘s abandonment of the
distinction between revenue-raising and regulatory taxes).
65. See Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44 (―Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on
activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate.‖); id. at 45 (―From the beginning of our
government, the courts have sustained taxes although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting
ulterior ends which, considered apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to
realize by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment.‖ (quoting A. Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Rivkin & Casey, supra
note 18, at 100 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)) (proposing that Congress
may not ―evade all of the constitutional limits on its authority by simply imposing ‗taxes,‘‖ but
failing to note the Supreme Court‘s later decisions to the contrary).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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determining how much of that income it will tax.67 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has explicitly observed that ―Congress‘[s] power to tax is virtually
without limitation . . . .‖68 There are, however, four constraints that might
arise when Congress passes a tax; the first three are textually explicit
constitutional constraints while the fourth is a judicially created constraint
that takes a constitutional dimension. First, a tax and its resulting
appropriations must serve the ―general welfare.‖69 Second, duties, imposts,
and excises must be uniform throughout the country.70 Third, direct taxes
must be apportioned among the states according to their populations.71
Fourth, a regulatory tax must not actually be a penalty; it must act like a
tax.72
This fourth (judicially created) constraint has been the central taxing
argument in the ACA litigation. While the government argued that the
mandate is an income tax or a uniform excise tax, the plaintiffs maintained
that the provision is instead a regulatory penalty that must be sustained, if
it can be, only under the Commerce Clause. The crux of the plaintiffs‘
argument, however, was not that the mandate has functional characteristics
of a penalty; instead, the plaintiffs asserted that Congress should not be
allowed to defend a regulation as a tax post hoc if the members did not call
the provision a ―tax‖ in its initial passage.73 The plaintiffs have thus asked
the courts to add a new dimension to this implicit constraint on the taxing
power: one that would require Congress to admit—during debates, in
legislative findings, or in the statute itself—that it is levying a tax rather
67. See Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 54 S. Ct. 758, 760 (1934).
68. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 79 (1983); see also United States v. Kahriger,
345 U.S. 22, 31 (1953) (noting that courts are generally ―without authority to limit the exercise of
the taxing power‖).
69. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 558, 589–90 (1937) (rejecting the
constraint that appropriations must pursue enumerated regulatory purposes); United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936) (interpreting the taxing power and General Welfare Clause to
cover any regulatory end, not just those that are separately enumerated).
Courts, however, defer to Congress‘s assessment of the ―general welfare,‖ leaving that
constraint with little, if any, bite. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (noting that
―courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress‖ on whether a tax furthers the
general welfare); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–42 (1937) (holding that Congress has
unreviewable discretion in deciding what constitutes the ―general welfare‖).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (―[A]ll Duties, Imposts[,] and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States[.]‖); see also Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 84–86 (applying the uniformity constraint).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (―Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers . . . .‖); see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205, 219 (1920) (invalidating a tax on
stock dividends as an unapportioned direct tax).
72. See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) (considering the distinction between a
tax and a penalty).
73. See Opening/Response Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant States at 44–46, Florida v. U.S.
Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067),
2011 WL 1944170, at *44.
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than imposing a penalty.74 Although this dimension of the tax–penalty
distinction has never been recognized by the Supreme Court, much less
applied to invalidate an exaction, it does have some support in Supreme
Court dicta: the Court has said that legislative intent is the touchstone for
determining whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty,75 and the legislators‘
references to a provision as a penalty—and active refusal to call it a tax—
give some indication of legislative intent (though, of course, the
legislators‘ true intent may have been to impose a new tax without
suffering political blowback from raising taxes).
Every court but one that has decided an ACA challenge has adopted
this constraint, holding that the mandate must be a penalty because the
bill‘s proponents said it was a penalty. For support, the courts have cited
the following facts: the mandate is labeled a penalty in all of the statutory
headings; the mandate is not included in the statute‘s list of revenue-raising
provisions; the legislative findings center on the mandate‘s effects on
interstate commerce; and President Barack Obama and his congressional
allies repeatedly insisted that the mandate was not a tax.76
Notably, these arguments render the distinction between penalties and
taxes purely semantic and process-based, rather than structural or
functional.77 Indeed, unlike the Child Labor Tax Case,78 on which the
plaintiffs largely rely, the ACA cases have not rested on any functional
aspects of the individual mandate. The plaintiffs have not argued that the
exaction is so hefty as to be penal,79 that it contains a scienter
requirement,80 that it is triggered by a violation of other regulatory
statutes,81 or that its disincentive effect will render the revenue effects
74. See Amar, supra note 36, at 8–12 (criticizing the taxing analysis for being purely
semantic).
75. See A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 46–47. The Court reasoned:
The statute here under review is in form plainly a taxing act, with nothing in its
terms to suggest that it was intended to be anything else. It must be construed, and
the intent and meaning of the legislature ascertained, from the language of the act,
and the words used therein are to be given their ordinary meaning unless the
context shows that they are differently used.
Id. But see Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 37–38 (treating an exaction as a penalty even though
Congress labeled it a tax).
76. See Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10–2347. 2011 WL 3962915, at *9–10 (4th Cir. Sept.
8, 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2011).
77. Amar, supra note 36, at 10 (―No structural purpose would be served by a judicially
fabricated Simon Says rule that taxes must always say ‗taxes.‘‖).
78. 259 U.S. at 20.
79. See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36, 38.
80. Id. at 37.
81. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935) (holding that an exaction was
a penalty because it was triggered only by a violation of state law).
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trivial.82 They have argued only that pro-ACA legislators and President
Obama called the exaction a penalty in all relevant sources.
b. The Tax Holdings as Enactment Cost Manipulation
Despite the formalism of the ACA cases‘ analyses, the rule they set fits
comfortably with other semisubstantive rules intended to increase
enactment costs, and there is little doubt that a semantic ―t-word rule‖
would, in fact, make economic impositions harder to pass. Congress‘s
taxing power is significantly broader than its commerce power. Congress
therefore has a strong incentive to use its taxing power to accomplish
regulatory ends because taxes will be more likely than penalties to survive
judicial scrutiny. But taxes are much harder to pass than penalties. As an
emerging body of psychology literature formally demonstrates, voters are
significantly more averse to exactions when they are labeled ―taxes‖ than
when they are labeled ―fees‖ or ―payments,‖ even when the exactions are
substantively and functionally identical.83 A rule that requires Congress to
label an exaction a ―tax‖ in order to invoke its taxing power, therefore, will
reduce the number of economic impositions that Congress can enact, and it
will force members of Congress to allocate their political capital carefully,
passing only those taxes that are truly valuable to the legislators.
This general ―magic words‖ strategy for increasing enactment costs—
with all its formalism—is quite common. Coenen provided several
examples of the strategy under the moniker ―form-over-substance rules‖ in
his survey of semisubstantive doctrines in the Rehnquist Court.84 Along
similar lines, Stephenson observed that courts often hold Congress to its
legislative history, rewarding ―good‖ debate while punishing ―bad‖
debate.85 Stephenson theorized that such rules are useful in forcing
Congress to engage in more politically difficult enactment deliberations
when it wants to pass constitutionally troubling legislation.86 A
requirement that Congress use the word ―tax‖ in legislative debates fits
82. This is an argument that the Supreme Court has rejected in dicta, but the argument would
at least center on some functional characteristic of the law. See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S.
42, 44 (1950) (noting that a tax will be valid even if it ―definitely deters‖ the taxed activity although
―the revenue obtained is obviously negligible‖).
83. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL‘Y & L. 106, 117–19 (2006) (reporting results of a cognitive study that showed general ―tax
aversion‖ whereby individual reacted more negatively to an exaction labeled as a ―tax‖ than to an
identical exaction labeled as a ―fee‖ or a ―payment‖); Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of
Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 161–
201 (1996) (considering various reasons that people dislike taxes); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting
the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 299–310 (2011) (considering
political and institutional barriers to raising taxes directly).
84. Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra note 21, at 1329–35.
85. Stephenson, supra note 21, at 43–45.
86. Id. at 42–55.
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comfortably with these legislative history rules. If the courts will refuse to
uphold an exaction under the taxing power unless the word ―tax‖ appears
in the legislative history, then judges will raise the enactment cost of
economic impositions. Finally, because the judges involved in the ACA
litigation looked to the words of the statute itself as well as the legislative
history, the ACA rule also has much in common with ordinary clear
statement rules, some of which require Congress to use ―magic words‖ in
order to invoke certain constitutional powers.87 In the end, then, the ACA
courts‘ analyses of Congress‘s taxing power align comfortably with
ordinary tactics of semisubstantive review and enactment cost
manipulation.
2. Commerce
The primary question in the ACA litigation—and the question that has
aroused the most scholarly debate—has been whether the mandate can be
sustained under Congress‘s power to regulate interstate commerce. The
government has argued that the decision to buy healthcare at the point of
service rather than through insurance—to pay out of pocket on each visit to
the doctor rather than paying a monthly fee for access to healthcare—is an
economic decision that Congress may regulate.88 The plaintiffs have
maintained that failure to buy insurance is not regulable economic activity
because it is not activity at all; it is inactivity.89 Several judges have agreed
with the plaintiffs, basing their decisions largely on libertarian rather than
federalism norms. My goal here is not to defend the action–inaction
distinction or the ACA judges‘ opinions generally. Rather, my goal is
simply to demonstrate that the Commerce Clause holdings can be situated
as semisubstantive holdings intended to increase the enactment cost of a
national insurance mandate. I will address the action–inaction distinction‘s
problems of judicial inadministrability and ―structural otiosity‖90 in Part
IV.

87. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 619–29 (1992)
(discussing ―super-strong clear statement rules,‖ which are basically magic words requirements, in
the Rehnquist Court‘s federalism cases prior to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995));
Manning, supra note 21, at 406–14 (providing examples).
88. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 38–39, Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10–2347, 2011
WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Feb. 18, 2011).
89. See, e.g., Opening Brief of Appellants at 20–21, Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10–2347,
2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2011).
90. See Hills, supra note 36 (calling the Commerce Clause arguments in the ACA litigation
―structurally otiose‖).
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a. The ACA Judges‘ Analyses
Under modern doctrine, there is no doubt that Congress‘s authority to
regulate interstate commerce extends to decisions that are both individual
and intrastate. That is, a given decision need not involve more than one
state nor even more than one person for the federal government to have
jurisdiction over it, so long as repeated instances of that decision will, in
the aggregate, either constitute interstate commerce91 or have a close
connection to interstate commerce.92 These powers might exist under the
Commerce Clause or under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which allows
Congress to use any appropriate means to effect the end of regulating
interstate commerce.93
In the New Federalism era,94 the Supreme Court has clearly limited the
reach of the ―close connection‖ test, but it has chosen not to limit
Congress‘s authority to regulate individual decisions that constitute
commerce when aggregated. The lesson from Lopez and Morrison, the two
Commerce Clause cases of the New Federalism movement, was that
noneconomic activities—decisions that are not themselves commercial—
cannot be regulated if their economic impacts occur through long causal
chains. Although the Supreme Court did not openly doubt that individual
decisions to carry a gun near a school95 or to assault a woman96 would,
when aggregated, have real effects on the American economy, it held that
the effects were too distant from the regulated decisions for the statutes to
be considered commercial regulations.97
These cases stand in stark contrast to Raich, in which the Supreme
Court upheld a prohibition on intrastate manufacture, sale, and possession
of marijuana—actions that the Court treated as economic in nature, which,
when aggregated, would constitute commerce.98 The Court thus held that
91. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–29
(1942).
92. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
93. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–57 (2010) (discussing the ―meansends rationality‖ standard for Necessary and Proper Clause determinations); see also Raich, 545
U.S. at 34–40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Raich holding ought to have been a
Necessary and Proper Clause holding rather than a Commerce Clause holding).
94. See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution‟s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on
the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 618–26 (1995)
(tracing the origins of ―the new federalism‖—the Court‘s renewed assertions of authority to enforce
federalism norms—from the 1970s through the Court‘s decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), which reasserted Commerce Clause limitations for the first time in decades).
95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563–64.
96. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
97. See id. at 612, 615; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563–64.
98. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (―Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities
regulated by the [Controlled Substances Act] are quintessentially economic.‖).
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the ban on marijuana production and distribution was, at its heart, a
commercial regulation and thus a rational approach to controlling the
interstate marijuana market.99 As the law currently stands, then, the
controlling distinction is between statutes targeting economic actions that
constitute commerce and those targeting noneconomic actions that
(eventually) affect commerce.
Under the distinction as drawn, the individual mandate is a permissible
regulation. The decision not to buy health insurance is an economic act
that, when aggregated, will constitute commerce. Of course, aggregated
individual decisions not to buy insurance will not constitute commerce in
health insurance. They do, though, constitute commerce in uninsured
healthcare—in healthcare financed at the point of service. That is,
aggregated individual decisions to forego insurance will sustain a
commercial market in uninsured care that would be less likely to exist if no
one made that decision, just as aggregated individual decisions to grow
medicinal marijuana in California will sustain an interstate black market in
recreational marijuana that would be less likely to exist if no one made that
decision. Indeed, the regulatory connection in the healthcare context is
even closer than in the marijuana context: health insurance and point-ofservice payments are exclusive economic substitutes. While the
maintenance of the recreational marijuana market depends on both the
growing of medicinal marijuana and the nonenforcement of marijuana
distribution, the maintenance of the market for uninsured care depends
only on the aggregated decision not to carry insurance.
While admitting that the decision to forego health insurance is
economic, the ACA plaintiffs urge that the legal distinction should also
depend on whether a given economic decision is a decision to do
something or a decision not to do something.100 Congress should be
allowed to regulate economic activity, they argue, but not economic
inactivity. Like the semantic tax–penalty distinction, this dimension of the
economic–noneconomic distinction has no doctrinal basis but some
support in Supreme Court dicta: the Commerce Clause cases consistently
refer to the regulable class as economic ―activities‖ rather than economic
―decisions.‖101
Of course, as any economist knows, the decision not to do something is
an active decision to do something else. That‘s just opportunity cost. But it
is conceivable that either the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and
99. Id. at 26 (―Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce
is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product.‖).
100. See, e.g., Opening Brief of Appellants at 20–21, Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10–2347,
2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. 2011).
101. See Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1292–95
(N.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that Congress must regulate economic ―activities,‖ not economic
―decisions‖).
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Proper Clause limits the federal government to regulating the taken
opportunity rather than the foregone one. That is, the federal government
might be allowed to penalize individuals only for taking an opportunity
that the government dislikes, not for rejecting an opportunity that the
government prefers. In this case, that would mean that Congress would
need to penalize individuals for consuming uninsured healthcare rather
than penalizing them for failing to buy insurance.102 Such a regime is easily
imaginable; Congress could impose an annual penalty on anyone who
obtained healthcare without insurance during the course of the year,
triggered upon an uninsured visit to the doctor.103 The penalty in that case
might need to be higher than the ACA penalty in order to keep the
decisional calculus the same (because individuals can avoid healthcare
visits for one or two years, thereby triggering the penalty less frequently),
but Congress could conceivably create an identical incentive to acquire
health insurance by regulating the ―action‖ (obtaining healthcare without
insurance) rather than the ―inaction‖ (failing to buy insurance).
b. The Commerce Clause Holding as Enactment Cost Manipulation
Both as a general matter of federalism and as a particular feature of the
action–inaction distinction, the ACA cases‘ Commerce Clause analyses
can be understood as enactment cost manipulation. Admittedly, scholarly
theories of semisubstantive review have generally treated federalism as a
substantive value that can receive indirect protection rather than as a tool
for providing indirect protection.104 Nevertheless, a few scholars have
argued, as both a descriptive and normative matter, that delegation to states
is a good way to protect individual liberty;105 the Supreme Court has
repeatedly argued that federalism is a means of protecting liberty rather
than an end in itself;106 and there can be little doubt that delegations to
102. Id. at 1291–92 (embracing the ―formalism‖ of holding that Congress may penalize the
purchase of uninsured healthcare but not the failure to purchase health insurance).
103. This is essentially identical to the regime at issue in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942). Although the regulatory goal was to decrease supply of and increase demand for traded
wheat, Congress did not punish farmers for failing to buy wheat on the general market. Instead, it
punished them for growing too much untraded wheat of their own. Id. at 115–16, 118–19.
104. See generally Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra note 21, at 1282
n.11; Manning, supra note 21, at 407. But see Hills, Individual Right to Federalism, supra note 21,
at 891, 904–05 (―The Rehnquist Court‘s federalism jurisprudence, however, might be regarded as
an indirect effort to vindicate . . . traditional [Fourteenth Amendment] entitlements . . . .‖).
105. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Liberty and Enumerated Powers, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 7,
2011, 10:50 AM), http://volokh.com/2011/06/07/liberty-and-enumerated-powers/; see also Hills,
Westphalian Liberalism, supra note 21, at 795 (―[A] commitment to the protection of federalism
implies a commitment to protection for private liberty.‖); Earl M. Maltz, Individual Rights and
State Autonomy, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 163, 184 (1989); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns,
Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 309–10 (2009).
106. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (discussing at length
federalism‘s goal of ―secur[ing] the freedom of the individual‖); New York v. United States, 505
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states will raise the enactment cost of a national regulatory project.
Furthermore, because federalism holdings allocate decisional responsibility
to costlier actors, they are quite similar to the semisubstantive doctrines
that require Congress rather than agencies to enact constitutionally
troubling regulations. It is therefore not at all implausible that Commerce
Clause limitations can and do function as semisubstantive rules, increasing
enactment costs for regulations that implicate substantive constitutional
norms.107 That said, my argument here does not at all depend on
downplaying the substantive value of federalism; my goal is only to
demonstrate that federalism has the additional feature of increasing
enactment costs.
As a general matter, delegations to states will raise the enactment cost
of a national regulatory project. Assuming that the members of Congress
and the stakeholders who motivate them want a uniform national policy, a
rule that they must accomplish their goal through state regulation will
require them to use horizontal rather than vertical federalization—a
strategy with significantly higher transaction costs.108 For obvious reasons,
getting fifty state statutes passed is harder than getting one federal statute
passed. Even if all of the states were willing to attempt coordinated
regulation, herding the cats of fifty state legislatures would be quite
difficult. Of course, Congress can pass conditional grants to incentivize
state cooperation,109 but that strategy not only requires some kind of
unpopular revenue increase to fund the grants but also allows for
individual state holdouts.110 Commerce Clause holdings, thus, are capable
of raising enactment costs if they effectively require state legislatures to
consent to a national regulatory project.
That said, not all Commerce Clause holdings have the effect of
prohibiting federal regulation and delegating the decision to the states, but
U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (noting that the purpose of federalism is to protect individuals, not ―States or
state governments as abstract political entities‖); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)
(―[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk
of tyranny and abuse from either front.‖); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985) (noting that the purpose of federalism was ―to ensure the protection of ‗our fundamental
liberties‘‖ (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting))).
107. Within Coenen‘s typology, federalism limits are species of ―who‖ rules, shifting authority
to the states. See Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra note 21, at 1370–81.
108. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A
General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 139–44 (2010) (discussing
transaction costs that arise when states try to coordinate for regulation).
109. See Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875 passim (2008)
(discussing conditional spending).
110. For instance, Arizona refused to join Medicaid until 1982. See Abbe R. Gluck, Room for
Debate: Is the Health Care Law Unconstitutional?: The Tenth Amendment Question, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 28, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/is-the-health-carelaw-unconstitutional/#abbe.
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a semisubstantive Commerce Clause holding could. In Lopez, for example,
the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) on
Commerce Clause grounds, but the majority issued a narrow holding with
no substantive dicta and with two easy options for congressional
reenactment. The opinion implied that the statute would have been
constitutional if it had included either a jurisdictional element111 or
congressional findings of a general impact on commerce.112 In response,
Congress reenacted the provision the next year, including both of the
suggested provisions,113 and nobody since has successfully challenged the
statute.114 The reenactment had slightly higher costs than the initial
enactment because it included legislative findings and the textual
jurisdictional limitation (which are not free to produce or include), but the
difference was likely minimal. The GFSZA has thus been in nearly
continuous effect since its initial passage in 1990, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court‘s holding.
If, instead of issuing this narrow holding, the Court had treated the
Commerce Clause challenge as a semisubstantive argument with Second
Amendment implications,115 it could have made a bigger difference to the
statute‘s enactment costs. The Supreme Court could have incorporated
broad Second Amendment principles into its Commerce Clause analysis116
in typical semisubstantive form. For example, it could have held that
individual decisions about where to carry or how to use a legally owned
gun are beyond Congress‘s power to regulate (perhaps unless the discrete
actions themselves cross state lines). A semisubstantive holding, then,
could have made it impossible for Congress to regulate guns near schools
111. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 561–62 (1995) (noting that the GFSZA
―contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the
firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce‖).
112. Id. at 562–63.
113. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009-369–3009-371 (1996).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2005).
115. A direct Second Amendment challenge would have been sure to fail at the time, but it
might succeed today. See, e.g., Brief for Academics for the Second Amendment et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Neither Party, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260)
(arguing that the Second Amendment proscribed the GFSZA, even though respondent Lopez had
not raised a Second Amendment challenge); cf. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050
(2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment‘s individual right into the Fourteenth Amendment so
that it also binds the states); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (holding, for
the first time, that the Second Amendment protects individual rights as well as states‘ rights).
116. Professor Roderick M. Hills, Jr. has argued that Lopez constitutes semisubstantive
protection for Fourteenth Amendment rights in education. Hills, Individual Right to Federalism,
supra note 21, at 889–91 (situating Lopez alongside Fourteenth Amendment education cases by
treating it as a case about ―school safety and discipline‖). I find this argument far less persuasive
than the Second Amendment possibility; there is no plausible argument that individuals, whether
parents, students, or teachers, should have a right to carry a gun to school in order to improve their
educations.
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without either relying on state implementation through conditional grants
or, say, criminalizing all concealable weapons (thereby targeting the
economic market instead of the individual behavior). Both of those
approaches would have had higher enactment costs. A conditional-grants
approach might have required revenue increases and certainly would have
allowed state holdouts, and the strategy of eliminating the market for
concealable weapons would have been politically much harder (if not
impossible).
This view suggests either that Lopez was not a semisubstantive holding
at all or that the Lopez Court was more cautious about semisubstantive
analysis given that the Second Amendment interest was not ―fundamental‖
at the time, a point that this Article returns to below.117 The point for now,
though, is that Commerce Clause holdings are capable of bearing all the
usual characteristics of semisubstantive review and enactment cost
manipulation.
Furthermore, the precise rule that the ACA courts have created—the
action–inaction distinction—can be understood as an attempt to raise
enactment costs for federal incentives related to personal financial
management. Assume, for the time being, that the holding is really about
taken versus foregone opportunities (rather than ―action‖ versus
―inaction‖) and that its applicability is limited to individuals‘ financial
management decisions.118 The rule, then, would be that congressionally
created incentives for saving must be tax incentives, entitlement programs
like Social Security and Medicare (which also exercise the taxing and
spending power), or penalties that arise when individuals resort to bad
opportunities because of their failures to save. Such incentives must not be
regularized penalties that apply to the everyday business of failing to save.
Understood this way, the rule has a clear substantive element insofar as it
relates only to individuals‘ freedom to manage their finances however they
see fit—up until the point that they create social costs because of their bad
choices.
This rule also has a relevant information-forcing feature of enactment
cost manipulation. One concern that courts might have about the ACA is
that the individual mandate is arguably overinclusive by requiring all
individuals to carry insurance, including those who save enough to afford
out-of-pocket healthcare.119 The five invalidating judges might believe that
the social costs of allowing some people not to participate in insurance
pools—the social costs of free-riding and adverse selection—are not
actually bad enough to justify the mandate‘s infringement on individual
liberty. A requirement that any federal penalty attach to a taken opportunity
117. See infra Part III.A.
118. See infra Part IV (discussing these two limitations more extensively).
119. See Stephenson, supra note 21, at 34–36 (discussing overinclusiveness as a reason for
substantive review and narrow tailoring requirements).
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rather than a foregone one would require Congress to show its hand in this
regard. If the free-rider and adverse selection problems are bad enough in
the legislature‘s view to justify the mandate, then Congress could pass a
penalty that triggers on the consumption of any uninsured healthcare, even
if the patient can afford to pay for that healthcare out-of-pocket. But if the
consumption of uncompensated care (obtained in emergency rooms, for
example) is the only cost sufficiently bad to justify the mandate, then
Congress would need to pass a penalty that triggers only upon consumption
of care that the patient cannot afford.120
The ACA cases so far undoubtedly represent extensions rather than
mere applications of current doctrine, and they rest on shaky structural
premises. Nevertheless, the cases‘ incorporation of libertarian norms into
the structural doctrines is far from novel. Both the tax and the commerce
analyses can be easily situated within the broader context of
semisubstantive constitutional review. Both holdings will increase the
enactment cost of a national insurance mandate, forcing Congress to decide
and reveal whether the collective interest in requiring health insurance
coverage is really important enough to justify the intrusion on individuals‘
healthcare autonomy and economic liberty.
II. THREE OBJECTIONS TO SEMISUBSTANTIVE REVIEW IN THE ACA CASE
Given that semisubstantive review is so common, the scholarly outrage
at the ACA judges‘ references to libertarian norms seems surprising. For
most scholars, however, that outrage seems primarily directed at the
asserted liberty interests themselves. The central scholarly objection is that
the mandate poses no important threat to individual liberty, not that
individual liberty must always be irrelevant to federalism analysis.121 The
question, then, is what makes a liberty interest important enough to garner
indirect judicial protection.
120. Neither of these options would, in my view, represent good policy. A penalty at the point
of service is simply draconian for the millions of uninsured Americans who already file for
bankruptcy due to medical bills, and it is less likely than the mandate to incentivize coverage. As a
purely legal and constitutional matter, however, this feature of the ACA holdings is certainly
reminiscent of information-forcing enactment cost manipulation.
121. Compare Hills, Individual Right to Federalism, supra note 21, at 891–97 (cataloguing
and defending the Rehnquist Court‘s semisubstantive federalism holdings), with Hills, supra note
24 (arguing that semisubstantive review is inappropriate in the ACA case). Other scholars have less
outwardly differentiated between the ACA case and others, but they have made their objections to
the libertarian arguments known, particularly in their regular invocations of Lochner. Cf. Jack M.
Balkin, The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate for Health Insurance, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 102, 104 (2009) (stating that Rivkin and Casey, supra note 18, cite the Child Labor
Tax Case, a Lochner-era decision, ―[t]o avoid the force of several decades of precedents‖); Peter J.
Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1723, 1726, 1737 (2011)
(noting that federalism is ―an inappropriate constitutional framework in which to consider‖
libertarian objections to the ACA).
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The literature has implied three possible distinctions between the ACA
case and the ordinary case of semisubstantive review. First, there might be
no relevant liberty interest at stake at all. Second, the identified liberty
interests might not have been breached in this case. And third, the liberty
interest might be of a kind that should not garner any judicial protection,
whether direct or indirect. This Part will consider each of these possible
objections in turn and will conclude that only the third presents a plausible
descriptive distinction between the ACA cases and the ordinary habit of
semisubstantive review.
A. Whether the ACA Involves Any Constitutional Liberty Interest
One possible objection to semisubstantive analysis in the ACA case—
the one suggested in scholars‘ assertions that there is no individual right to
be uninsured—is that there is no constitutionally relevant liberty interest at
stake.122 The point here is not that the mandate does not infringe the
constitutional liberty interests that the plaintiffs have raised (which is the
point that I address next) but rather that the liberty interests themselves are
not constitutionally relevant. A desire to be uninsured, the argument goes,
is simply not a constitutional interest.
But the premise underlying this objection is clearly wrong. The ACA
plaintiffs have raised broader liberty interests than a freedom to be
uninsured, and those broader interests undoubtedly retain constitutional
relevance. The plaintiffs have in fact raised two constitutional liberty
interests, the freedom of health and the freedom of contract. Their
arguments have centered on both the right to control their own medical
care and the right to choose whether and when to enter into a contract with
a private individual or corporation.123
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has never applied a bare freedom of
health to invalidate state action,124 and no court has applied the freedom of
contract since the death of the Lochner era in 1937.125 The rarity of judicial
invalidation, however, does not establish that the liberty interests are
constitutionally irrelevant. In the modern rights paradigm, there is a widely
acknowledged ―double standard‖ of judicial review, by which some
constitutional rights garner strict judicial protection while others are left
primarily to political safeguards.126 Within this paradigm, economic
122. Smith, supra note 121, at 1726, 1737.
123. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 11–13, 20–21, Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 102347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2011).
124. See Moncrieff, supra note 6, at 2215–27 (tracing the freedom of health through Supreme
Court precedent and noting that it has been used to invalidate state action only when combined with
reproductive freedoms).
125. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (ending the Lochner era).
126. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 10 (4th ed. 1982) (noting that courts apply ―a double standard of judicial attitude,
whereby governmental economic experimentation is accorded all but carte blanche by the courts,
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liberties are left almost entirely to politics,127 and at least some parts of the
freedom of health are likewise. The Supreme Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg, for example, held that the freedom to obtain a physician‘s
assistance in hastening death ought to be left to political elaboration in the
states.128 Importantly, however, the modern paradigm denies neither that
healthcare autonomy and economic liberties exist nor that they should be
protected.129 If it did, then courts would not bother with rational basis
review when litigants asserted those rights; they would simply dismiss all
such arguments for failure to state a claim. Rather, the modern rights
paradigm holds that the political process suffices to provide protection for
those liberties.130
In one of the first and most influential statements of modern rights
analysis—the Carolene Products footnote in which Justice Harlan F. Stone
delineated the kinds of legislative encroachments that require strict judicial
review131—the Court‘s justification for refusing scrutiny to economic
liberties was not that they were unimportant or nonexistent. Rather, the
rationale was that judicial protection is necessary and appropriate only
when the political process fails to provide adequate protection of its

but alleged violations of individual civil rights are given meticulous judicial attention‖); see also
Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51
DUKE L.J. 75, 77 & n.11 (2001) (quoting ABRAHAM, supra).
127. The judiciary will review deprivations of economic liberty, including those affected
through regulation, under the Takings Clause. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978). However, the Supreme Court almost never invalidates regulations on this
basis. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
128. 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (―Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest
and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.‖); see also Hills,
Individual Right to Federalism, supra note 21, at 894 (characterizing the Glucksberg holding as
leaving a substantive due process question to political elaboration in the states). Interestingly, the
Court doubled down on this view with its structural holding in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243
(2006) (holding that the federal government may not prohibit the states from using federally
controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide).
129. See generally Strauss, supra note 10, at 381–86 (defending the propriety and usefulness
of recognizing a freedom of contract).
130. Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor made this point explicit in her Glucksberg concurrence,
writing:
Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family member‘s
terminal illness. There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike
the proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent
individuals who would seek to end their suffering and the State‘s interests in
protecting those who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
131. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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own.132 According to Justice Stone, judicial review is particularly
important for legislation that arises from distortions in the political process
(such as prejudice against ―discrete and insular minorities‖) and for
legislation that creates new distortions in that process (such as restrictions
on voting, speech, assembly, and association).133
This basic idea evolved into one of the most influential holistic theories
of constitutionalism and judicial review with Dean John Hart Ely‘s
Democracy and Distrust, which argued that judges should intervene only
to correct distortions in the representative process.134 As a descriptive
matter, Ely‘s ―representation reinforcing‖ theory does not explain why
particular rights fall on one side or the other of the ―double standard.‖
Courts often give heightened protection to fully represented rights and
classes and sometimes deny heightened protection to underrepresented
rights and classes.135 But that is not the important point for present
purposes. The point here is that, doctrinally speaking,136 the justification
for relegating some rights to political protection has never been that those
rights are constitutionally unimportant or nonexistent. It has only ever been
a notion about the proper judicial role in rights enforcement. Indeed, as
previously mentioned, if economic liberty were entirely irrelevant to
substantive constitutional rights, the judiciary would not even bother with
rational basis review; it would simply dismiss all such arguments for
failure to state a claim.
There can be no doubt, then, that the ACA plaintiffs have evoked
constitutionally relevant (small-―l‖) libertarian norms. Those norms might
not deserve indirect protection through semisubstantive review, but they
are unquestionably constitutional in nature.
B. Whether the Individual Mandate Violates the Asserted Liberty Interests
A second and more plausible objection to semisubstantive review in
the ACA litigation lies in the view that the individual mandate does not
violate the freedom of health or the freedom of contract. This argument
132. Id. Admittedly, Justice Stone started the footnote with a distinction between enumerated
and unenumerated rights, id., but that particular distinction has fallen by the wayside in the modern
era of implied fundamental rights. See Baker & Young, supra note 126, at 81–83 (noting a few
reasons that the textual distinction is unsatisfying in the modern rights era).
133. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
134. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW passim
(1980) (developing a holistic philosophy of judicial review out of the notion that judges should
intervene to correct representational failures).
135. See Baker & Young, supra note 126, at 83–84.
136. There have been academic arguments that economic liberties should be given no
constitutional consideration. See, e.g., Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 45–50 (summarizing and
rejecting this scholarly argument). However, there has been no serious suggestion in the doctrine
that economic liberty is constitutionally irrelevant.
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could take one of two forms, both of which rest on plausible premises but
only one of which could distinguish the ACA case from the ordinary case
of semisubstantive review. The first such argument is that no court would
invalidate the individual mandate even if the judges were applying the
substantive doctrines in their most robust forms. The second is that the
individual mandate cannot be said to violate the substantive doctrines
because the mandate was enacted through the supermajoritarian political
process, which serves as the only testing ground for laws that restrict
nonfundamental liberties such as the freedom of health and the freedom of
contract. Again, both of these arguments rest on plausible premises, but
only the second presents a viable distinction between this case and the
ordinary semisubstantive case.137
The first argument utterly fails to differentiate the ACA litigation from
ordinary semisubstantive review. Although it is almost certainly true, as a
doctrinal matter, that a court applying robust forms of the freedom of
health and freedom of contract would uphold the individual mandate
against those challenges, semisubstantive review does not depend on the
presence of an actual constitutional violation. In fact, the opposite may be
true. Process-based invalidations seem to be more common for statutes that
would not be held invalid on direct review.138 That said, it is of course also
true that semisubstantive invalidation is and ought to be inappropriate for a
challenge that raises no true constitutional concerns, even if it nominally
appeals to a constitutionally relevant interest. Courts have therefore applied
semisubstantive review only for statutes that raise serious constitutional
questions or doubts—or at least pose genuine challenges to broad
constitutional values.139 But the individual mandate does that.
1. The Freedom of Contract
Consider the freedom of contract argument. I‘ll be the first to admit
that the arguments against the mandate are weak. Even during the Lochner
era, when the freedom of contract received robust judicial enforcement, the
case against the mandate would be significantly harder to make than
scholars have implied in their passing references to the ACA plaintiffs‘
137. See infra Part III.
138. See Manning, supra note 21, at 404 (―Indeed, the defining feature of constitutionally
inspired clear statement rules is that even when a given interpretation of a statute would not violate
the constitutional provision[s] from which the triggering value emanates, that interpretation might
still be said to collide with the background value itself.‖); Posner, supra note 53, at 816 (noting that
semisubstantive review creates ―a judge-made constitutional ‗penumbra‘‖ by invalidating statutory
applications that would not be unconstitutional on direct review); Vermeule, supra note 30, at
1960–61 (discussing this point and providing examples); Young, supra note 21, at 1552 (arguing
that ―soft limits‖ on constitutionally sensitive regulations are justifiable as judicial ―resistance
norms‖).
139. See Young, supra note 21, at 1551 (defending semisubstantive review as a means of
―push[ing] interpretations in directions that reflect enduring public values‖).
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Lochner-like arguments. The Lochner Court itself upheld insurance rate
regulations against substantive due process challenges140 under an
exception for ―statutes fixing rates and charges to be exacted by businesses
impressed with a public interest.‖141 Under that exception, the Court
allowed indirect approaches to rate regulation, including regulations of
insurance brokers‘ commissions,142 and it might, therefore, have upheld the
mandate as a measure intended to decrease rates by combating adverse
selection. Furthermore, the Lochner-era Court twice dodged the question
of whether compulsory insurance laws might breach the freedom of
contract, refusing to invalidate apparent insurance mandates.143 Notably in
this regard, the first state requirement for automobile insurance passed in
Massachusetts in 1925, at the height of the Lochner era,144 and mandatory
workers‘ compensation regimes, which some states treated as insurance
requirements, were introduced in the 1910s.145 It is therefore not at all
obvious that compulsory insurance provisions would violate the freedom
of contract even if the substantive doctrine were enforced directly.
Nevertheless, there is something to Professor Randy Barnett‘s
insistence that a health insurance requirement is different in kind from all
other laws compelling private economic transactions.146 First, unlike other
such penalties, including those upheld in Wickard v. Filburn147 and Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,148 as well as all other kinds of
140. See O‘Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257 (1931);
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 412–13 (1914). Notably, during this era,
insurance was not considered to be interstate commerce. Congress therefore could not implement
rate regulations, but the states could. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868), overruled by
United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass‘n, 322 U.S. 533, 552–53 (1944).
141. Adkins v. Children‘s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546–47 (1923).
142. See O‟Gorman, 282 U.S. at 257 (reasoning that brokers‘ commissions, ―being a
percentage of the premium, bears a direct relation to the rate charged the insured . . . [and is
therefore] a vital element in the rate structure‖).
143. See Alaska Packers Ass‘n v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 294 U.S. 532, 541–43 (1935)
(noting that a California court had characterized the state‘s workers‘ compensation regime as
―compulsory insurance,‖ but upholding the regime against a freedom of contract challenge on the
ground that it merely assigned liabilities); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 219 (1917) (declining
to address the constitutionality of a compulsory workers‘ compensation regime that did not bind the
party before the Court); see also In re Opinion of the Justices, 129 A. 117, 120 (1925) (upholding
New Hampshire‘s compulsory automobile insurance law against Equal Protection and dormant
Commerce Clause challenges but failing to address a freedom of contract challenge).
144. JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH NOFAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 8 n.1 (2010), available at
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG860.pdf.
145. Gregory P. Guyton, A Brief History of Workers‟ Compensation, 19 IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J.
106, 108 (1999), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ PMC1888620/.
146. See Barnett, Commandeering the People, supra note 18, at 583–87.
147. 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942) (holding that Congress could penalize a farmer for growing
wheat for use on his farm).
148. 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964) (holding that Congress could penalize private businesses who
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compulsory insurance provisions, the ACA mandate is triggered simply by
being a resident of the United States.149 One need not buy a car, buy a
home, employ people, open a motel, or grow wheat in order to trigger the
ACA‘s penalty. Second, unlike other bare requirements of residency, the
individual mandate is a requirement regarding private behavior. It is not a
public duty of citizenship, like registering for the draft or serving on a
jury—requirements for participation in popular government. Nor is it a tax
(because it‘s not labeled a tax!), nor is it even an obligation to participate
in a public entitlement program like Social Security or Medicare (which
have participation requirements even for those who did not pay into the
systems through taxation). The individual mandate is a requirement that all
residents of the United States enter into private contracts with private
insurance companies. Third, the ACA mandate is not quite like other
simple incentives for private purchases, such as the first-time homebuyer
tax credit.150 Unlike those incentives, the ACA mandate has been
accompanied by an extensive rhetoric of obligation, including the
―mandate‖ moniker as well as state-interest justifications related to freerider and collective action problems. Perhaps these kinds of ―expressive‖
harms should not matter in the constitutional analysis, but they often do.151
Overall, these arguments are almost certainly insufficient to invalidate
the ACA on direct substantive review. Indeed, all they really prove is that
the ACA mandate is unprecedented. That said, however, the arguments do
raise a hint of constitutional doubt under a basic freedom of contract; if
nothing else, the novelty of the ACA demonstrates that the precise
constitutional question has not been answered before. And these arguments
certainly appeal to a general public value of economic liberty.152 All told,
refused to serve African-Americans).
149. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
150. See First-Time Homebuyer Credit, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/
0,,id=204671,00.html (last visited March 18, 2012). Notably, no one treated the first-time
homebuyer credit as a requirement that everyone buy a house, even though it was functionally
indistinguishable from the insurance mandate. All U.S. residents who failed to buy a house in the
relevant tax years paid $8,000 more in taxes than they otherwise would have, which as a percentage
of compliance cost is pretty close to the $695 penalty for failure to buy health insurance. Id. The
average home cost about $270,000 in 2009, making the penalty about 3% of the cost of compliance.
See Average Home Prices 2009, MONEY-ZINE.COM, http://www.money-zine.com/FinancialPlanning/Buying-a-Home/Average-Home-Prices-2009/ (last visited March 18, 2012). The average
family health insurance plan costs about $15,000, making the penalty about 5% of the cost of
compliance. See Average Cost of Family Health Insurance Plan Climbs 9 Percent,
INSURANCEQUOTES.COM, http://www.insurancequotes.com/family-health-insurance-cost-rises/ (last
visited March 18, 2012).
151. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1532 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are
Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725,
733 (1998).
152. Certainly, if we take the Tea Party movement as a form of popular constitutionalism, then
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then, the right answer is likely that the mandate is not constitutionally
problematic but that the ACA plaintiffs have done enough to trigger
ordinary semisubstantive review.
2. The Freedom of Health
In addition to their broad assertions of economic liberty, the plaintiffs
have raised the more limited argument that the individual mandate
impermissibly intrudes on healthcare autonomy. This argument, too, is
quite weak on direct doctrinal analysis. The negative liberty interest that
the Supreme Court has recognized in freedom of health cases is merely an
application of the interest in bodily autonomy—a freedom to control
medical decisions in order to control one‘s bodily health. That freedom
clearly includes a freedom to reject healthcare—an extension of the
common law rule that forced treatment constitutes battery—and it also
includes a freedom to obtain at least some kinds of healthcare, particularly
reproductive services.153
The ACA mandate, however, is a requirement for health insurance, not
healthcare. Individuals with health insurance remain free to reject
whatever care they do not want and to consume whatever care they do
want, though they might need to pay out-of-pocket for care that the insurer
deems medically unnecessary.154 The negative liberty interest is therefore
largely, if not entirely, intact.155 In short, the individual mandate does not
require Americans to ―eat their broccoli‖—only to pay for it.156
we can say in somewhat conclusory fashion that the mandate raises constitutional doubts and
intrudes on public values. See generally Ilya Somin, The Tea Party Movement and Popular
Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300 (2011); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular
Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2012).
But see Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party Movement?, 105
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 288, 289 (2011) (arguing that ―the Tea Party movement calls into
question some of the central claims of popular constitutionalism‖).
153. See generally Moncrieff, supra note 6, at 2216–27 (discussing the Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the freedom of health).
154. See id. at 2247–51 (discussing the relevance of medical necessity review to the
constitutionality of the individual mandate under a freedom of health); see also B. Jessie Hill, What
Is the Meaning of Health? Potential Constitutional Implications of Defining “Medical Necessity”
and “Essential Health Benefits” Under the Affordable Care Act, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming
2012) (discussing the ways in which the ACA will involve government in definitions of medical
necessity, potentially in abrogation of the freedom of health).
155. But see Marshall B. Kapp, If We Can Force People to Purchase Health Insurance, then
Let‟s Force Them to Be Treated Too, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 2012).
156. See Andrew Koppelman, Health Care Reform: The Broccoli Objection, BALKINIZATION
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/01/health-care-reform-broccoli-objection.html; see
also Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1288–89
(N.D. Fla. 2011) (―Congress could require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular
intervals, not only because the required purchases will positively impact interstate commerce, but
also because people who eat healthier tend to be healthier, and are thus more productive and put
less of a strain on the health care system.‖).
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Nevertheless, the mandate raises a handful of plausible constitutional
concerns under the freedom of health, including two narrow doctrinal
questions and one broad values-based challenge. As a doctrinal matter,
courts do sometimes invalidate mandatory payment structures when
constitutionally important goods and services are at issue. In the First
Amendment context in particular, the Supreme Court has invalidated two
kinds of purely fiscal regimes that seem roughly analogous to the
individual mandate.
First, subsidization and fee-setting regimes for artistic, religious, or
political expression are unconstitutional if they are not neutral with respect
to ideological content.157 Even though such regimes obviously leave
speakers free to engage in their preferred expressive activities with their
own money, the Court has held that government may not distort the
relative price to the speaker of various expressive contents. The same rule
might render medical necessity review constitutionally problematic once
government starts requiring everyone to have an insurance contract;158
medical necessity review and its resulting payment decisions are
emphatically non-neutral with respect to the relative values of medical
services, and they definitely distort the relative price to the patient of
various treatment decisions.159 Admittedly, these same arguments have
failed in the abortion context; the Supreme Court has upheld non-neutral
subsidization regimes, such as Medicaid‘s coverage of childbirth but
exclusion of abortion services.160 The constitutional calculus might look
quite different, though, for aspects of healthcare that do not involve lifeand-death decisions or fetal interests.161
157. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995)
(invalidating a university policy of refusing to fund religious student groups on the ground that the
policy would chill religious expression on campus); Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement,
505 U.S. 123, 137 (1992) (invalidating a fee-setting regime for parades and assemblies in public
places on the ground that the regime was not content-neutral and would therefore chill expression).
158. There is one important distinction, which is that the payment decisions are made by
private companies rather than state agencies. Under the state action doctrine, that distinction might
make all the difference, even though insurance companies are highly regulated. See Am. Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58 (1999) (holding that private insurers‘ utilization review, even
when specifically statutorily authorized, does not constitute state action). The individual mandate
and the ACA‘s additional insurance regulations, however, might render the government sufficiently
entangled with the insurance companies to allow a finding of state action. See, e.g., Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721–26 (1961).
159. See, e.g., Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204–05 (2004) (recounting the
stories of two plaintiffs who (to their detriment) made healthcare decisions according to their
insurers‘ determinations of medical necessity rather than purchasing doctor-recommended care outof-pocket).
160. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326–27 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479–81
(1977).
161. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992)
(acknowledging that states have ―a substantial interest in potential life‖ that needs to be balanced
against a woman‘s reproductive autonomy).
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Second, the Supreme Court has held that laws requiring crosssubsidizations of private commercial speech are unconstitutional, even
though such regimes obviously leave speakers free to craft and convey
their own messages with their remaining funds.162 The individual mandate
creates the same kind of mandatory cross-subsidization for healthcare by
requiring individuals to purchase comprehensive coverage rather than
insuring only against their individual risks.163 The purpose and effect of the
minimum coverage provision is to pool risk more broadly, redistributing
from the healthy to the sick.164
I do not mean to suggest here that the individual mandate violates the
freedom of health simply because it resembles unconstitutional speech
regimes. The freedom of speech is given significantly greater weight in
constitutional law than the freedom of health; there is a rule in First
Amendment law that financial allocations constitute protectable expressive
actions under the First Amendment,165 which obviously makes economic
regulations harder to pass in the First Amendment context; and the broad
value underlying the First Amendment is the freedom of belief, which is
more likely to have communitarian and financial dimensions than the
highly individualistic, physical value of bodily integrity. The point here,
however, is only that the individual mandate is not free and clear of
constitutional doubt simply because the statute is about health insurance
rather than healthcare. The mere retention of negative liberty is not always
sufficient in constitutional analysis. At a minimum, these analogical
arguments might be enough to create the kind of constitutional doubt that
frequently triggers semisubstantive review.
More generally, the individual mandate raises a specter of excessive
governmental involvement in healthcare decisionmaking, as the Tea Party
has made clear in persistent references to healthcare rationing166 and
162. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001); Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,
Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 466 (1997); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1990); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222–23 (1977); see also Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech,
23 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 148–49 (2006) (discussing the forced subsidization cases in the
compelled speech doctrine).
163. For example, an individual with minimal or no risk of becoming diabetic must
nevertheless pay for diabetes coverage. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(1)(I) (West 2010) (requiring
individuals to carry coverage for ―chronic disease management‖). That requirement is, and is
intended to be, a mandatory subsidization of diabetic individuals‘ healthcare consumption.
164. See Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1887–88 (2011)
(discussing health redistribution as one of the ACA‘s three goals).
165. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
166. See Martin Feldstein, ObamaCare Is All About Rationing: Overspending Is Far
Preferable to Artificially Limiting the Availability of New Procedures and Technologies, WALL ST.
J.,
Aug.
18,
2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204683204574
358233780260914.html; Sarah Palin, Lies, Damn Lies—Obamacare 6 Months Later, It‟s Time to
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socialized medicine167 (the two bogeymen that the freedom of health would
be most likely to prohibit).168 Although the penalty attached to the
individual mandate is far from draconian and although individuals remain
free in the post-ACA world to choose whatever course of treatment they
prefer (as long as they can afford it), the mandate is undoubtedly a
requirement for participation in a national healthcare system. It is plausible
that the freedom of health is, broadly speaking, about allowing individuals
to choose their healthcare environment, including the choice of whether an
outside or government entity oversees their healthcare consumption
decisions. The plaintiffs‘ arguments about healthcare autonomy, thus,
evoke a relevant public value that might suffice to trigger semisubstantive
review.
Like the freedom of contract arguments, these arguments are
undoubtedly insufficient to hold the mandate unconstitutional on a direct
freedom of health challenge. But they probably would be sufficient to
trigger ordinary semisubstantive review if the freedom of health were
entitled to indirect protection.
C. Whether Nonfundamental Liberties Get Indirect Protection
The third possible objection to semisubstantive review in the ACA
litigation—and the one that seems to drive scholars‘ invocations of
Lochner when criticizing the plaintiffs‘ libertarian arguments—is the view
that nonfundamental liberties should not receive any judicial protection at
all, whether direct or indirect. This objection is the only one that provides a
viable descriptive distinction between the ACA case and the ordinary case
of semisubstantive review.
Both Coenen, in his exhaustive review of Rehnquist Court
semisubstantive review, and Professor Roderick M. Hills, Jr., in his lessexhaustive consideration of the Rehnquist Court‘s federalism
jurisprudence, found that the Court provided indirect protection only to
fundamental substantive values,169 or at least substantive questions that are
categorically aligned with fundamental values.170 Assuming their
Take Back the 20!, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/
2010/09/24/sarah-palin-health-care-reform-obamacare-berwick-death-panels-facebook/ (reasserting that
―those rationing ‗death panels‘ are there‖ in the ACA).
167. See, e.g., MICHAEL F. CANNON, CATO INSTITUTE, DOES BARACK OBAMA SUPPORT
SOCIALIZED MEDICINE? (2008), available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub _id=9679;
Shikha Dalmia, ObamaCare Is a Trojan Horse for Socialized Medicine: Why Medicare-Style
Insurance Will Kill Our Health Care System, REASON.COM (June 19, 2009),
http://reason.com/archives/2009/06/19/obamacare-is-a-trojan-horse-fo; Palin, supra note 166
(urging voters to ―repeal and replace Obamacare‖ with ―free market reform‖).
168. See Moncrieff, supra note 6, at 2238–51.
169. See Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra note 21, at 1283–84; Hills,
Individual Right to Federalism, supra note 21, at 889–91.
170. Hills‘ argument was really that the Rehnquist Court protected ―noneconomic‖ liberties in
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characterization is right, the ACA case is certainly different from other
semisubstantive cases. There can be little doubt that the freedom of health
and freedom of contract are not currently fundamental liberties for
constitutional purposes. The freedom of contract lost its fundamental status
with the death of the Lochner era in 1937.171 As for the freedom of health,
the Supreme Court once referred to the freedom to reject care as a
―significant liberty interest,‖172 but it applied something less than strict
scrutiny in that case and has generally deferred to a wide range of state
interests in freedom of health cases.173 The one federal appellate opinion
that deemed the freedom to obtain care a fundamental liberty interest was
promptly overturned en banc and then denied certiorari.174
There might, therefore, be a genuine descriptive distinction between the
ACA cases and a typical case of semisubstantive review insofar as the
asserted liberties are not fundamental liberties.175 The question, though, is
whether that distinction should make a difference.
III. EXTENDING INDIRECT PROTECTION TO NONFUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES
In the end, the best possible objection to the incorporation of libertarian
norms in the ACA cases is the argument that semisubstantive review does
not and should not extend to nonfundamental liberties. In its best light, the
argument would go as follows: Nonfundamental liberties are those that we
self-consciously leave to political protection. It is precisely because these
substantive values are adequately represented in the ordinary political
process that judicial review is unnecessary. By definition, then, a duly
enacted statute cannot be said to violate nonfundamental substantive due
process because the only process that is due for the deprivation of these
liberties is bicameralism and presentment; those procedures are sufficient
to ensure that the collective interest in regulating is strong enough to justify
the infringement of liberty. In short, semisubstantive review is judicial
this way. He thus aligned the Commerce Clause cases with the ―zone of privacy‖ in Fourteenth
Amendment law by pointing out that the boundaries of both doctrines seem to be defined by their
―noneconomic‖ nature. This point does not quite argue that only fundamental rights get indirect
protection, but it suggests that liberty interests must be in the same ―zone‖ as fundamental rights in
order to get protection. Hills, supra note 21, at 889–91.
171. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (ending the Lochner era).
172. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (―We have no doubt
that . . . respondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration
of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖).
173. See Moncrieff, supra note 6, at 2226–27 (noting that the freedom of health might be
fundamental, given the Court‘s usual balancing approach in freedom of health cases, but also noting
that a wide range of regulatory projects count as compelling state interests for healthcare
regulation).
174. See Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 703, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
175. Above, I noted hesitations about Coenen‘s and Hills‘ characterizations of the precedents.
See supra notes 143–144 and accompanying text.
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review ―lite,‖ and that practice is inappropriate for liberties that have been
removed from judicial protection altogether.
Although this argument has normative force, its conception of
fundamentality is too static and its conception of political safeguards
overly simplistic. Semisubstantive review in the context of
nonfundamental liberties could serve two important and normatively
desirable purposes. First, it could allow the judiciary to test political
reactions to libertarian infringements in order to discern whether a liberty
interest ought to garner stronger judicial protection. Second, even for
liberties that clearly are and ought to remain nonfundamental,
semisubstantive review allows the judiciary to give heightened protection
to structural rules when they are most important: when they are serving as
the only safeguards of liberty. This Part will elaborate each of these
arguments in turn.
A. Value Uncertainty and Enactment Cost Manipulation
In Stephenson‘s theory of semisubstantive review, his central claim is
that judicial manipulation of legislative enactment costs helps to cure a
particular informational problem in the judicial balancing of constitutional
constraints against collective preferences.176 The problem he identifies is
that all constitutional constraints should and do give way when a collective
interest in breaching them is sufficiently strong, but the political branches
have better information than the judiciary about the true strength of an
asserted collective interest. By raising the cost of political action when
constitutional values are at stake, the judiciary gains important information
about public preferences and collective needs and thereby cures the
information asymmetry. If the political branches can reenact the
problematic policy at the judicially manipulated higher price, then the
asserted collective interest is much more likely to be genuine.
Stephenson‘s theory, however, explicitly assumes away any uncertainty
about the value of the underlying constitutional constraints themselves.177
Indeed, Stephenson differentiates more generally between the
countermajoritarian difficulty,178 which he deems a legitimacy problem
176. See Stephenson, supra note 21, at 11:
I advance the stronger claim that judicial imposition of additional enactment costs
on legislatures enables courts to reduce their comparative informational
disadvantage. The better-informed government decisionmakers will only be
willing to act when their true interest in the policy is sufficiently strong;
government exaggeration of its true interest becomes a less viable strategy.
177. Id. (―[T]he Article assumes away concerns about whether the courts assign the
appropriate level of normative significance to various rights, values, and interests.‖).
178. Id. at 9 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962)). See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an
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with judicial definition of constitutional values, and the balancing
difficulty, which he deems an informational problem in judicial
determinations of constitutionally relevant facts.179
The dichotomy between fact and value, though, is not as strong as
Stephenson implies. The importance of a particular constitutional
constraint is not an abstract, fact-free value that judges unilaterally declare
and then perpetually enforce. Instead, constitutional values are evolutive.
They are both contingent on and responsive to popular social norms—
contingent because judges are part of the populace and thus part of the
shifting social environment, and responsive because judges seem aware of
their own legitimacy constraints and willing to concede to popular
pressures rather than risk court-packing or some other institutional
attack.180 As a result, individual liberties can and do shift between
fundamental and nonfundamental status as social norms change, as
demonstrated by the death of the Lochner era. And the phenomenon is not
always as stark as ―the shift in time‖; the first declaration of an abortion
right, for example, looked like it received strict scrutiny,181 but as the right
has evolved in the face of popular resistance, its judicial protection has
ebbed.182 In short, popular political preferences are relevant not only to
state interest overrides but also to the strength of the constitutional
constraints in the first place.183
Take, then, Stephenson‘s theory that judicial resistance to
antilibertarian legislation is a useful way to gain information about the
strength of an asserted state interest. The same theory ought to apply when
the information the judiciary lacks is the strength of popular interest in a
general (small-―l‖) libertarian norm. If a nonfundamental liberty constraint
seems to be gaining popularity, the judiciary can use indirect protection
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J.
153 (2002) (detailing the countermajoritarian problem); Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian
Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933 (2001) (same).
179. Stephenson, supra note 21, at 9–11.
180. For an exhaustive historical survey of this phenomenon, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at
370–71.
181. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
182. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163–68 (2007).
183. This idea has much in common with the notion of popular constitutionalism, though I
mean to offer a much more limited idea than the wholesale theories advanced by Dean Larry
Kramer and others. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9 (1999); see also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 15 (1999);
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
927, 928–29 (2006). The argument is not that the people are, or should be, ultimately responsible
for defining the boundaries of constitutional liberties. It is only that the judiciary frequently does
lend relevance to the subjective preferences of the governed when deciding how libertarian
boundaries are defined and enforced, and enactment cost manipulation can help the judiciary in that
project.
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and enactment cost manipulation to test political willpower. If the political
process continues to infringe the liberty interest without provoking further
litigation, the judiciary can decide that the liberty is not worth elevating to
fundamental status. If, however, the political process cannot overcome the
higher enactment cost to pass additional legislation, then the interest in
liberty must be stronger than its nonfundamental status would imply.
Alternatively, if many or all subsequent infringements provoke
constitutional challenges, then the judiciary could conclude that political
safeguards are failing to account for the strong libertarian preferences of a
minority group, and perhaps the judiciary should assign fundamental status
to the liberty interest on that ground. A minority group‘s willingness to
incur the costs of litigation reveals important information about the depth
of its preferences.
To make this point more concrete, consider the ACA case. It certainly
seems plausible that the Tea Party movement is, in part, an assertion of
popular dissatisfaction with the nonfundamental status of economic liberty
or healthcare autonomy. It also seems plausible, as a purely descriptive and
predictive matter, that a deeply held and widely felt dissatisfaction of this
kind could motivate the Supreme Court to elevate the freedom of contract
or the freedom of health to fundamental status. But the actual depth and
breadth of popular dissatisfaction is extremely hard to judge based on a
single controversy, particularly for the politically insulated judiciary. With
the Tea Party‘s arguments against the ACA as its only datum so far, the
Supreme Court is in a poor position to decide whether it ought to heighten
judicial protection for these two interests.
Structural invalidation, however, would help the judiciary to overcome
its informational deficiency. Imagine that many states, including some that
are party to the current litigation, enacted individual mandates after
structural invalidation of the ACA. That would serve as a strong signal that
the libertarian interest was not the problem with the ACA—that the
plaintiffs were motivated by a genuine federalism interest or by pure
political opportunism. Or imagine that many states enacted mandates, but
they were all non-plaintiff states. That would indicate that the libertarian
interest is stronger in some states than in others, which might be enough to
justify the federalism holding.184 Or imagine that Congress enacted an
individual mandate under its taxing or spending powers or enacted a
penalty for purchases of uninsured or uncompensated healthcare. Any of
those outcomes would indicate that the libertarian interest was not held
deeply or widely enough to block the (now costlier) federal legislation. On
the other hand, imagine that the political process became incapable of
reenacting a mandate in any of its permissible (and costlier) forms.
Although that single case would not be enough to justify a change in
184. See generally Hills, Westphalian Liberalism, supra note 21, at 776–77; Maltz, supra note
105, at 164; Wilkinson, supra note 105, at 304–22.
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constitutional doctrine, it would provide the judiciary with relevant
information about evolving norms and preferences surrounding the
freedoms of health and contract.
These points might seem inconsistent with the view of nonfundamental
liberties presented throughout this Article so far. The doctrinal justification
for giving mere ―rational basis‖ review to nonfundamental liberties has
always been that the supermajoritarian political process provides sufficient
protection. If that is true, then there should be no need for the judiciary to
know whether popular will has shifted in the direction of assigning greater
import to a nonfundamental liberty. In all of the relevant cases, the people
and their representatives will be able to effect the end of libertarian
protection simply by voting against infringing legislation.
As noted briefly above, however, this representation-reinforcing theory
does not explain the complement of fundamental liberties that the judiciary
has chosen to protect or the methods the judiciary has chosen for protecting
them.185 Again, as a purely descriptive and predictive matter, the judiciary
seems to care about popular libertarian preferences and to shift liberties
between fundamental and nonfundamental status in response to shifting
norms. My point here is only that enactment cost manipulation is a useful
way for the courts to gain information about libertarian preferences, to
whatever extent they are relevant, just as it is a useful way for the courts to
gain information about regulatory preferences. To the extent that the Court
wants to test the breadth and depth of popular demand for stronger
substantive liberties, semisubstantive review will help it to do so.
B. Safeguarding the Safeguards
Even if the judiciary wants to maintain the nonfundamental status of
economic and healthcare freedoms, though, it still makes sense for the
courts to take structural doctrines more seriously when nonfundamental
liberties are at stake—and therefore to incorporate libertarian concerns into
their structural analyses. Indeed, in some senses, the case for using
semisubstantive review ought to be stronger for nonfundamental liberties
than it is for fundamental ones.
There have been many defenses of semisubstantive review over the
decades (as well as many critiques), but the one overarching justification
for the practice is that it allows courts to make constitutional violations
harder without making them impossible.186 This has two virtues: first, it
decreases error costs associated with direct judicial balancing of state and

185. See Baker & Young, supra note 126, at 83–84 (discussing cases that fail to track the
representation reinforcing theory).
186. See Young, supra note 21, at 1552; Monaghan, supra note 20, at 28–29 (noting the
desirability of congressional involvement in the elaboration of constitutional rights); Stephenson,
supra note 21, at 5–6.
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individual interests,187 and second, it better preserves the political
branches‘ co-equal role in elaborating substantive constitutional norms.188
There is a strong argument to be made that these effects lose their
desirability when the substantive constitutional value at issue is a
nonfundamental liberty.189 Assuming that such liberties are
nonfundamental because the political process can be trusted to strike the
right balance between collective and individual interests, there is no reason
for the judiciary to make these kinds of constitutional intrusions any harder
than they already are under supermajoritarian regulatory requirements like
bicameralism and presentment. Judicial oversight of the interest balance is
entirely unnecessary, the argument goes, and the judiciary ought not to
have a co-equal role in elaborating these norms.
This argument is fine if the regulatory process has unquestionably
abided by all of its structural requirements and limitations. But if there is
ever a time that structural limitations ought to matter, it is when the
regulatory process is threatening to intrude on a liberty interest that is
constitutionally important but not judicially enforced. That is, the argument
that a duly enacted statute cannot be said to violate a nonfundamental
liberty interest may be exactly right—but it ought to raise the question of
whether an infringing statute was, in fact, duly enacted. When
nonfundamental liberty interests are implicated in a structural
constitutional challenge, it makes sense for the judiciary to be vigilant
about structural constitutional rules. In such cases, the judiciary can claim
to be safeguarding the safeguards of liberty at a time when those
safeguards demonstrably matter.
To make this point more concrete, contrast the ACA situation as I have
presented it with an alternative presentation. Imagine that I have overstated
the threats to liberty that the ACA presents, in the characterization of either
the constitutional questions or the liberty interests themselves. That is,
imagine that the ACA raises no serious doubts under the freedom of health
or freedom of contract or that those freedoms are entirely irrelevant. If that
were true (and if it were true that the ACA‘s enactment process might have
violated structural constitutional constraints), what would be the value of
strict judicial construction and enforcement of structural rules? The only
value would be that of the rules themselves: federalism in the abstract and
deliberation in the abstract. Those values might be important as abstracted
safeguards of liberty or as abstracted values, and it might therefore be
worth enforcing the structural rules. But it ought to be clear that the total
value of enforcement would increase if there were also a constitutional
liberty interest at stake.
187. See Stephenson, supra note 21, at 5–6; see also discussion supra Part III.A (describing
information effects).
188. See Monaghan, supra note 20, at 27.
189. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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It is also worth contrasting this view with semisubstantive review of
fundamental liberties. As discussed previously, the argument for
semisubstantive review ought to be stronger for nonfundamental liberties
than for fundamental ones. The reason is that fundamental liberties are, by
definition, those that should not be invaded for the satisfaction of pure
majoritarian interests.190 The justification for removing such liberties from
the political process is not entirely clear: it might be that majoritarian
enactment processes will not account for strongly felt minority interests;191
it might be that fundamental rights are ―implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty‖192 and therefore necessary for societal functioning;193 or it might be
that fundamental liberties are those that are morally required, regardless of
majority views.194 Regardless, the purpose and effect of affording strong
judicial protection to fundamental liberties is to remove them from
majoritarian or even supermajoritarian regulatory processes.
Semisubstantive review, however, does not do that. Unlike direct
substantive invalidation, semisubstantive review allows the political
process to re-infringe liberty simply by paying a higher enactment cost.
There might be good reasons to pursue this strategy, for example: a sense
that the collective regulatory need is compelling enough to justify the
intrusion on liberty, a sense that the intrusion on liberty is not significant
enough to deserve full-blown substantive invalidation, or a sense that the
political branches should have a role in elaborating substantive
constitutional values. But the theoretical case for mere semisubstantive
review of fundamental liberties (as opposed to full judicial review) is
harder to make (requires greater nuance) than the case for safeguarding the
safeguards of nonfundamental liberties.
IV. SAFEGUARDING OR DISTORTING THE SAFEGUARDS
Of course, the argument that judges are merely safeguarding the
safeguards demands that semisubstantive structural holdings be defensible
as enforcing rather than distorting the structural rules. Otherwise, judges
are doing something other than upholding the constitutional mechanisms of
libertarian protection (which might nevertheless be justified as enactment
cost manipulation or something similar but which requires additional
190. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
191. See ELY, supra note 134, at 135.
192. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
193. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Role of Individual Substantive Rights in a Constitutional
Technocracy 1–8 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1874204 (arguing that fundamental rights protect regulatory
regimes that are systematically insusceptible to good technocratic regulation due to inherent value
uncertainties).
194. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1978) (discussing the view that
individuals and politicians in this country believe that constitutional rights carry a normative
quality, as opposed to being arbitrarily subject to the whims of the majoritarian politic).
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argument). This potential problem has been a common critique of
semisubstantive review generally, particularly with respect to the
constitutionally motivated rules of statutory construction, which often lead
judges to pursue unnatural interpretations of statutory language.195 It has
also been a common critique of the holdings in the ACA cases, as scholars
have accused the ACA judges of creating two judicially inadministrable
and structurally otiose rules in their holdings: both the ―t-word rule‖ for the
taxing power and the action–inaction distinction for the commerce power.
As critiques of the judges‘ holdings so far, I agree. An openly
semisubstantive opinion, however, could do much better.
A. Taxing
In the absence of semisubstantive analysis, the taxing argument in the
ACA opinions looks purely formalistic. The rule that the ACA judges have
set so far is that Congress may not pass a tax without using the word ―tax‖
in its deliberations. But the judges provide no theoretical justification for
such a rule, and unlike functional analyses in the cases on which the judges
rely, the analyses in the ACA cases does not give any hint as to why
Congress‘s taxing power cannot sustain the individual mandate. The
problem is not that the mandate is not, in fact, a tax. It‘s just that members
of Congress and President Obama refused to admit that it is, in fact, a tax.
In the absence of some kind of substantive democratic or libertarian
concern, this rule is just silly.
But, of course, there are substantive concerns underlying the rule. First
and most obviously, the general value of democratic accountability comes
into question if Congress can hide the ball during its enactment
deliberations. It is not clear, though, that this kind of abstracted
accountability concern should matter for Article I, Section 8 analysis.
Congress did not lie about the effect the mandate would have on
individuals, and that effect is relevant to taxing and revenue-raising for the
general welfare—ends that Congress may pursue under its power to ―lay
and collect [t]axes.‖196 Given the course that the deliberations took, an
informed voter should have realized (and probably did realize) that the
mandate looked and quacked a lot like a tax. Overall, the argument that a
bill‘s supporters must use the word ―tax‖ is not really an argument that
they must make their deliberations more transparent, but rather that they
must make their deliberations more salient by highlighting the compulsory
nature of the exaction.197
If the ―t-word‖ analysis incorporated concerns about economic liberty
and healthcare autonomy, however, then a requirement for this particular
195. See Young, supra note 21, at 1577–78.
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
197. See Schenk, supra note 83, at 256–63 (distinguishing among transparency, salience, and
complexity).
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kind of negative salience would become much more rational—and much
more limited. The ACA plaintiffs‘ substantive concerns are that Congress
has imposed a new requirement on residency and has obligated
participation in a national healthcare system. Both of those potentially
troubling aspects of the mandate align well with the general aversion to
―taxes.‖
First, unlike penalties, taxes are requirements of residency. At least in
the public consciousness and largely in reality, taxes are unavoidable
obligations of living in the United States whereas penalties attach to bad
behavior and can be avoided through good behavior. If the freedom of
contract problem with the mandate is that it creates an unavoidable
obligation of residency, as Barnett has repeatedly suggested, then it might
make sense to require Congress to use the word ―tax‖ in its deliberations in
order to ensure that voters understand this particular feature of the
mandate. In other words, because the word ―tax‖ is more salient as an
obligation of residency, its presence in the debate will provide more honest
structural protection against this particular freedom of contract problem.
The holding, then, could be that Congress must use the word ―tax‖ when it
wants to create a new universal obligation, sustainable under its taxing
power, because the presence of the word ―tax‖ will help voters to
understand the proposal‘s implications for economic liberty. It will
therefore provide better and more honest structural protection against
infringements of the nonfundamental liberty interest.
Second, unlike penalties, taxes are more closely associated with
redistribution and social welfare. Particularly in a country with a safety net
and a progressive income tax, voters probably associate taxing and
spending programs with issues of redistribution in a way that they do not
associate penalties with those issues. If the freedom of health problem with
the mandate is that it requires universal participation in a scheme of crosssubsidization and health-based redistribution, then the word ―tax‖ will do a
better job than the word ―penalty‖ at stimulating debate on the value and
propriety of those effects. A semisubstantive ACA case, then, could hold
that Congress must use the word ―tax‖ rather than the word ―penalty‖ when
it wants to create constitutionally problematic redistributive programs—
like healthcare-related redistributive programs—because the presence of
the word ―tax‖ will help voters to realize the proposal‘s implications for
this kind of healthcare autonomy. The word ―tax‖ will enhance the
operation of the liberty‘s structural safeguards.
In short, the word ―tax‖ generally is more salient than the word
―penalty,‖ but the ACA holding need not be a general requirement that
Congress use a negatively salient word in order to exercise its taxing and
spending power. Two reasons for that saliency are directly related to the
ACA plaintiffs‘ and judges‘ substantive libertarian concerns. The ACA
judges could therefore reasonably hold that the political process—because
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it is the only testing ground for and safeguard against infringements of
economic and healthcare liberties—must raise the liberty concerns in a
salient way if it wants infringements to survive constitutional scrutiny. The
―t-word rule‖ will create that specific kind of salience in this case,
enhancing (not distorting) the structural safeguard.
B. Commerce Clause
Like the ―t-word rule,‖ the action–inaction distinction is a formalistic
one, and it is also extremely likely to cause problems of judicial
inadministrability in the general form that the ACA cases have applied so
far. If, however, the judges engaged more openly in semisubstantive review
and took into consideration the narrow libertarian arguments that the
plaintiffs have made, then they could craft a much more manageable and
rational rule.
The problem that the mandate seeks to solve is that individuals are
irrationally optimistic about their personal health198 and are therefore
insufficiently risk-averse when managing their healthcare finances.
Because individuals believe that they are unlikely to require costly medical
interventions, they do not save enough to be able to afford such
interventions when needed. Congress attempted to correct this problem by
penalizing the irrationality itself—by penalizing the everyday business of
failing to save—rather than by penalizing the undesireable effects of that
irrationality, such as the consumption of uninsured or uncompensated
healthcare.
The plaintiffs‘ substantive argument is, in large part, an argument that
individuals have a right to be irrational in this particular way, at least so
long as the irrationality is not causing acute harm. The irrational
individuals are making decisions about contracts and healthcare, both of
which are constitutionally protected even when irrational, and it might also
be true that not all of these individuals are consuming uncompensated care,
filing for bankruptcy, or contributing to adverse selection as a result. In its
best form, a semisubstantive holding would reason that this irrationality
problem looks more like a behavioral problem falling under the states‘
police powers than a commercial problem falling under Congress‘s
enumerated powers. A regularized penalty for a lifestyle decision or for a
cognitive failure does not ―regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States‖;199 it regulates an individual behavioral problem that sometimes (or
even usually) has commercial implications. This semisubstantive view
aligns the case much more closely with Lopez and Morrison, which hinged
198. See Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to
Debiasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 313
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (describing the persistence of optimism bias in patients‘
judgments of their own health risks).
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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on the Court‘s characterization of the statutes as behavioral rather than
economic regulations.200
Of course, a semisubstantive invalidation would also need to hold that
the mandate cannot be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause.201
The correction of optimism bias is undoubtedly one possible means of
reducing adverse selection problems and regulating health insurance
markets, which are both commercial ends. Under a typical Necessary and
Proper Clause analysis, this means–ends rationality ought to render the
mandate constitutionally permissible. Under an openly and aggressively
semisubstantive analysis, however, the Court could hold that a regularized
penalty for failing to save is not a proper tool for the national government
to use because it has implications for individual liberty. The Court could
argue that national incentives for saving, all of which will intrude on
economic liberty to one degree or another, should take openly compulsory
forms, such as taxes, or should attach only to acute harms, such as
consumption of uninsured care. In other words, the Court could argue that
national incentives should target taken opportunities rather than foregone
ones202 so that voters will be able to see clearly and to combat effectively
the antilibertarian consequences of the enactments. Otherwise, the decision
to incentivize savings should not rest with Congress but with the states,
which provide better safeguards for liberty, given their advantages of
diversity, voice, and exit.203
Notably, the analyses in the ACA cases so far and the semisubstantive
analysis proposed in this Article would (like all semisubstantive analyses)
leave options open for Congress to reenact the mandate‘s precise incentive,
either through ―t-word‖ taxation or through penalties on taken
opportunities. To the extent that Article I, Section 8 intends to facilitate
corrections of interstate collective action problems, the ACA cases would
not fully disrupt that goal.204 If there is such a collective action problem in
health insurance markets and if it is problematic enough to justify the
intrusions on healthcare autonomy and economic liberty, then Congress
will be able to reenact the mandate at the higher enactment cost.
CONCLUSION
I want to reiterate that I believe the ACA to be constitutional under all
current doctrines. I also am not personally inclined to value the libertarian
200. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Part I.B.1.
203. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
204. See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 104, at 117–20 (discussing collective action
problems); Neil S. Siegel, Free-Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the
Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3–
4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1843228.
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interests that the ACA plaintiffs have asserted. I count myself as a lucky
resident of Massachusetts, where I am already obligated to carry health
insurance,205 and I believe that the functional benefits of a national
mandate will outweigh any antilibertarian costs.206 Nevertheless, the
scholarly reaction to the ACA cases seems out of proportion to the
opinions‘ faults, and the scholarly discomfort with the blending of
substance and structure seems entirely misguided. The ACA plaintiffs‘
arguments and the invalidating judges‘ opinions represent ordinary
semisubstantive arguments, and I can see no reason why the habit of giving
structural protection to substantive values should not extend to
nonfundamental liberties. Indeed, it seems a good idea, at least in theory.

205. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
206. See generally Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism, supra note 37.

